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As corporations increasingly dominate our economic, social, and political
lives, and as shareholders vie for greater influence over business policies, can
a new "discourse theory" of the firm guide the evolution of corporate law
better than current theories primarily focused on shareholder wealth
maximization? A series of related developments render the question of
paramount importance to sustaining the basic efficacy of business decisions
and the legitimacy of our polity as well. First, existing corporate law
principles provide insufficient guidance regarding how managers should take
into account the various shareholder and stakeholder interests expressed with
increasing variety and intensity. Second, the impotence of corporate law to
sustain minimal trust in the collection, reporting, and disclosure of social data
threatens the viability of the $32 trillion market for corporate social
responsibility. Third, the prevailing corporate law regime permitting corporate
managers to ignore various shareholder and stakeholder interests becomes
morally untenable as corporations aggressively dominate the political
landscape. At the core of each of these three problems lies a fundamental
failure to engage in effective discourse with the constituencies that
corporations should ultimately serve. Unless legal doctrine evolves to embrace
effective discourse as a guiding principle for assessing corporate decisions, the
efficiency of corporate practices and the legitimacy of the polity hang in the
balance.
This Article represents the second major installment in a series that advances
a new "discourse theory" of the firm. Discourse theory provides a set of robust
political and organizational principles to guide the evolution of corporate law
doctrine in a way that provides meaningful insights regarding the proper place
of shareholders and other stakeholders in affecting corporate decisions. While
the first work in the series provided a skeletal introduction regarding the
amenability of corporate law to discourse theory, this Article puts substantial
doctrinal meat on the bones by fleshing out in detail the legal standards and
organizational mechanisms for implementing a new discourse theory of the
firm. The Article concludes that implementing a new discourse theory of the
firm would help solve the problems infecting current corporate law, promote
greater efficiency in business decisions, and ensure basic legitimacy within the
political realm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As corporations increasingly dominate our economic, social, and political
lives, and as shareholders vie for greater influence over business policies, can a
new "discourse theory" of the firm guide the evolution of corporate law better
than current theories primarily focused on shareholder wealth maximization? A
series of related developments render the question of paramount importance to
sustaining the basic efficacy of business decisions and the legitimacy of our
polity as well.
First, existing corporate law principles provide insufficient guidance
regarding how managers should take into account the various shareholder and
stakeholder interests expressed with increasing variety and intensity. Although
often perceived by corporate managers as nettlesome distractions, shareholder
and stakeholder opinions now present potential avenues for significant
economic growth; ignoring their concerns puts the corporation at risk for
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serious sanctions from investors, consumers, and the communities the
corporations inhabit. As the new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chair, Mary Jo White, recently stated in a December 2013 speech at the
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue:
When shareholders have the ability to scrutinize a company's corporate
governance practices, they can help to identify areas of improvement. But, this
only happens if the board and management invite shareholder engagement and
actively consider the interests of the shareholders they serve. Even in
companies with so-called state of the art corporate governance practices,
engagement with shareholders provides very valuable feedback and insights.I
Current corporate law doctrine predicated upon shareholder wealth
maximization, however, relegates shareholders to relatively passive roles and
says precious little about the degree to which corporations should heed concerns
of employees, community members, and other stakeholders affected by
corporate practices. Although an increasing number of corporate managers tout
the need to engage shareholders and stakeholders at some level, the quality of
the discourse remains dysfunctional at best. In some instances, corporations
suffer attack by zealous interest groups that privilege moral positions over profit
motives. As one scholar noted, "[Y]ou haven't seen shareholder activism until
you see a nun battling it out with CEOs. They can be devastating." 2
On the other side of the failed discourse, shareholders and other
stakeholders often feel ignored or intimidated by corporate managers. For
example, Chevron recently subpoenaed from one of its largest shareholders,
Trillium Asset Management, documents related to Trillium's proxy proposals
that requested the SEC to review the accuracy of the company's environmental
disclosures and asked the company to designate one board seat for an
environmental expert.3 After suffering an $18 billion judgment from an Ecuador
court related to environmental harms, Chevron brought a racketeering claim in
the United States against a host of parties and asserted "Trillium was working
closely with plaintiffs in the Ecuador case to pressure Chevron into a
settlement."4 Chevron's retaliation against Trillium received fast criticism as an
inappropriate attack on the legitimate voicing of important shareholder
1 Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 10th Annual
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue (Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://www.sec.
gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540434901#.UqDvRMuA2cM.
2Michael R. MacLeod, Emerging Investor Networks and the Construction of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 34 J. CORP. CITIZENSHiP 69, 81 (2009) (citations omitted).
3 Gretchen Morgenson, Chevron Aims at an Activist Shareholder, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/12/09/business/chevron-takes-aim-at-an-activist-share
holder.html.
4 Id.
2014] 105
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
concerns. 5 But even in the absence of acrimony, a happy yet hapless discourse
among corporate managers, shareholders, and stakeholders does not clearly
result in improved corporate practices or greater profits. As a result, existing
corporate discourse often imposes significant costs without garnering clear
mutual gains.
Second, the impotence of corporate law to sustain minimal integrity and
trust in the collection, reporting, and disclosure of social data threatens the
viability of the $32 trillion market for corporate social responsibility (CSR).6
With snowballing celerity, consumers and investors take into account a variety
of social, environmental, and ethical criteria before purchasing a company's
products or stock.7 In an efficient market, consumers and investors should
reward companies that comply with CSR preferences by paying a premium in
stock or product price. To the extent that premium exceeds the cost of
compliance, corporations gain along with CSR-focused consumers and
investors.8 If a Pareto improvement results where all parties enjoy greater
welfare, the market for morality creates new economic wealth. Current
corporate law, however, permits corporations to engage in a kind of strategic
ambiguity in their public disclosures that enables pilfering a CSR premium
without actually embracing CSR practices. 9 If consumers and investors cannot
trust the integrity of corporate communications, a corporate version of a classic
Prisoner's Dilemma results. Continual dissembling by corporations, however,
cannot go undetected or unpunished by the market. After recognizing a
systemic failure in transparency regarding CSR data, rational shareholders and
consumers will stop paying ostensibly socially responsible companies a
premium in stock or product price.)0 Even though corporations, shareholders,
and stakeholders could realize a win-win exchange through the market for
social responsibility, current corporate law provides incentives for defective
behavior that spoils potential gains for any interested party. Absent new
corporate law principles that ensure higher quality collection, reporting, and
disclosure of CSR data through enhanced discourse, the market for socially
responsible behavior will eventually collapse.
5 d. (reporting that Chevron's "actions against a shareholder are nonetheless
remarkable" and quoting an investment firm executive who stated, "A shareholder making a
legitimate appeal to the company doesn't deserve this kind of counterattack").
6 PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INv., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 2 (2012), available at
http://d2m27378y09r06.cloudfront.net/viewer/?file=wp-content/uploads/Annualreport2012
1.pdf (reporting that as of May 2012, owners and managers of assets valued at more than
$32 trillion signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, an
international compact whereby signatories pledged to screen investments based on certain
environmental, social, and governance issues).
7 See id.
8 See infra Part II.B.
9See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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Third, the prevailing corporate law regime permitting corporate managers to
ignore various shareholder and stakeholder interests becomes morally untenable
as corporations aggressively dominate the political landscape. The recent
Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC, I which gives corporations
essentially the same political speech rights as humans, invites corporations to
dictate even further the political process. Although corporations remain distinct
from sovereign nations, as corporations occupy territory previously allocated to
government and control the political agenda, the legitimacy of the polity
remains inextricably tethered to the legitimacy of corporate decision-making.
Within existing current corporate doctrine predicated upon shareholder wealth
maximization, however, no processes for robust and transparent democratic
deliberation exist that would provide the necessary sense of legitimacy in either
setting to thrive.
At the core of each of these three problems lies a fundamental failure to
engage in effective discourse with the constituencies that corporations should
ultimately serve. Unless legal doctrine evolves to embrace effective discourse as
a guiding principle for assessing corporate decisions, the efficiency of corporate
practices and the legitimacy of the polity hang in the balance.
This Article represents the second major installment in a series advancing a
new "discourse theory" of the firm that would promote both economic
efficiency and political legitimacy. The first article in the series, A New
Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United,12 identified the basic need
for a new discourse theory of the firm through exploring a "tectonic shift"l 3 in
the evolution of the corporation from a simple investment vehicle for generating
wealth to an institution that plays a dominant role in almost every aspect of our
collective lives. Inspired by the decision in Citizens United and the
controversial (and later invalidated) SEC Rule 14a-11,14 which gave certain
shareholders the right to nominate a dissident slate of directors using the
corporation's own proxy statement, the article attempted to provide a more
descriptively accurate account of the influence shareholders and stakeholders
possess over corporate governance. The growth of corporate power involved a
concomitant clamoring by shareholders and other activists for a greater say in
corporate decision-making.15 But controlling corporate law doctrines continue
to ignore the changing nature of the firm and the actual role shareholders and
stakeholders play in shaping corporate behavior. Establishing what role
shareholders and stakeholders should play still presents a highly contested
question without a nuanced corporate law theory to provide a coherent answer.
11558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).12 Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 161 (2010).
131d. at 162-63.
14 1Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782-87
(Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
15 See Siebecker, supra note 12, at 179-89.
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Discourse theory, however, provides a set of robust political and
organizational principles to guide the evolution of corporate law doctrine in a
way that provides meaningful insights regarding the proper place of
shareholders and other stakeholders in affecting corporate decisions. The first
article in the series laid out the basic philosophical blueprint for employing
discourse theory within a corporate law construct. 16 Building upon the collected
works of political philosopher Jurgen Habermas, the article suggested that the
legitimacy of corporate decisions should not depend on whether they maximize
shareholder wealth but instead on whether they emerge from full and fair
discussion among the constituencies that corporations serve. 17 Grounded in the
notion that robust discourse enhances the effectiveness and justness of the
organizational structures that affect our lives, a discourse theory of the firm
requires crafting rules and incentives that promote independent expression of
opinions, equal participation by affected parties in deliberative processes,
respectful consideration of viewpoints, and the ability to alter past decisions
through continued discourse.' 8 The article concluded that affording
shareholders a right to nominate a dissident slate of directors on the corporate
proxy statement would provide a necessary initial step to ensure continual
engagement between corporate managers and the constituencies they serve. 19
Thus, implementing discourse theory within existing corporate law would better
enable corporate managers to align business practices with evolving market
preferences.
While the first work in the series simply provided a skeletal introduction
regarding the amenability of corporate law to discourse theory, this Article puts
substantial doctrinal meat on the bones by fleshing out in detail the legal
standards and organizational mechanisms for implementing a new discourse
theory of the firm. To accomplish that goal, Part II identifies the interconnected
problems that plague existing corporate law jurisprudence and spur a need for a
fresh organizational construct centered on reflective discourse. Based on the
recognition that inadequate communication lies at the core of each of the
problems described, Part III explicates how the basic tenets of a new discourse
theory of the firm might solve those potentially disastrous communication
shortcomings. Part IV describes the legal standards through which courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, and non-governmental organizations could
incentivize and enforce a more robust discourse within corporate decision-
making and disclosure. Part V then surveys a variety of organizational methods
and practices for discourse that corporations could adopt to satisfy the legal
standards proposed. With a critical eye, Part VI explores some implications of
adopting a new discourse theory. The Article concludes that implementing a
new discourse theory of the firm would help solve the problems infecting
16d. at 198-208.
17Id. at 185.
18Id. at 199-200.
19Id. at 225-30.
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current corporate law, promote greater efficiency in business decisions, and
ensure a basic legitimacy within the political realm.
II. THE TROUBLED WATERS OF CORPORATE LAW
A confluence of interconnected problems drives the need for a new
discourse theory of the firm. First, the quickly growing influence of activist
shareholders, stakeholders, and interest groups provides a special impetus for
corporations to attend to those voices in a manner that benefits, rather than
harms, the firm. Current corporate law doctrine, however, provides insufficient
guidance regarding how to harmonize the cacophony of those often discordant
voices, with corporations left foundering regarding which interests to heed or to
eschew. Second, the impotence of corporate law to secure a sense of trust in the
collection, reporting, and disclosure of social data threatens the collapse of the
$32 trillion market for CSR. Third, as corporations occupy an increasingly
dominant role in all aspects of social, political, and economic life, corporate law
doctrine must secure a more robust sense of legitimacy in corporate decision-
making. But in light of the ongoing spate of corporate scandals reflecting a
pathological privileging of managerial interests above the common good and
with Citizens United enticing corporations to dominate even further the political
realm, the prevailing corporate law regime that allows, if not encourages,
corporate managers to ignore shareholder and stakeholder interests becomes
morally untenable. In essence, the very legitimacy of our political system now
remains inextricably tied to the legitimacy of corporate decisions and practices.
A corporate law regime predicated simply upon the maximization of
shareholder wealth adulterates rather than promotes the bedrock sense of
legitimacy necessary for our democratic values to sustain.
A. A Cacophony of Corporate Voices
Despite the growing activism and influence of shareholders, stakeholders,
and other interest groups regarding corporate practices, existing corporate law
doctrines provide little guidance regarding which viewpoints corporations
should heed or perhaps ignore. 20 Regardless of the lack of meaningful guidance
in the law, many market professionals and academics suggest that corporations
20See MacLeod, supra note 2, at 79 (arguing the recent growth of institutional
investors led to "a sharp rise in investor (or shareholder/shareowner) activism (or
engagement), which covers a broad spectrum of investor activities including selling shares,
private discussion or public communication with corporate boards and management, press
and other public campaigns, openly talking and/or organising with other shareholders,
putting forward shareholder resolutions, [and] calling shareholder meetings"); Edward B.
Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 849, 851-53
(2012) (describing a new "era of empowered shareholders"); Siebecker, supra note 12, at
179-89 (discussing the evolution of shareholder activism and the legal status of shareholders
in affecting corporate policies).
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should take better account of shareholder and stakeholder concerns. Although
debate continues about whether acquiescing to shareholder preferences
produces economic gains, Professor Ed Rock suggests that:
We live in an era of empowered shareholders. . . . That new reality requires
rethinking the relationship between shareholders and the firm. Learning how to
interact productively has never been more important to shareholders or firms.
From a regulatory perspective, we need to reconsider some current limitations
that treat shareholders like children. 21
The corporate world may indeed find itself in a new era of shareholder and
stakeholder activism, but corporations differ markedly in their approaches to
considering those increasingly ardent opinions. 22
For some corporations, shareholder and stakeholder activism provides
opportunities for corporations to gauge more effectively consumer and investor
preferences in a manner that generates economic growth. For example,
Smithfield Foods runs the largest pork production and processing operation in
the world.23 The Humane Society publicly criticized Smithfield for raising its
pigs in unethical conditions and ultimately filed suit against the company in
2011.24 The Humane Society asserted that Smithfield later changed its
husbandry practices as a direct response to the Humane Society campaign.25
Smithfield now emphasizes in its 2012 Integrated Report that implementing
more humane animal management systems "benefits our pigs and also our
company's overall financial health" through positive effects in reputation,
relationships with consumers, and production levels.26 Though simply
21 Rock, supra note 20, at 853.22 See White, supra note 1 (acknowledging that corporate managers and shareholder
interest groups may disagree about the proper shape shareholder engagement should take).
23 Smithfield's website claims: "Today we are a $13 billion global food company and
the world's largest pork processor and hog producer." Corporate Information, SMITHFIELD
FOODS, http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/overview.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2014); see
also David Barboza, Goliath of the Hog World; Fast Rise of Smithfield Foods Makes
Regulators Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/07/business/
goliath-of-the-hog-world-fast-rise-of-smithfield-foods-makes-regulators-wary.html?pagewa
nted=all&src=pm.
24 Dina Spector, 11 Amazing Facts About the McDonald's McRib, Bus. INSIDER (Dec.
17, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazing-facts-about-the-mcdonalds-
mcrib-2012-12?op=l.
25 Greg Hack, Seaboard Foods Changes Language on Animal Treatment, KAN. CITY
STAR (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/13/4064146/seaboard-changes-
language-on-animal.html ("In response to its campaigns, the Humane Society said, other
producers such as Smithfield Foods, Cargill and Hormel Foods 'have begun moving away
from gestation crates'. . . . ).
26 See SMITHFIELD FOODS INc., 2012 INTEGRATED REPORT, at 21 (2012), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SFD/2747261510x0x590240/F33D665C-409C-
4825-A50E-D7F90C10F399/smi integrated_12.pdf.
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anecdotal, Smithfield provides one example of potentially effective discourse
between the corporation and the constituencies it affects.
Moreover, recent empirical studies demonstrate that the market places a
positive value on shareholder access27 and that equity analysts take into account
the quality of communication between managers and corporate stakeholders in
assessing stock value. 28 Even absent proof positive that shareholder activism
enhances shareholder value, the reputational and branding benefits to
stakeholder engagement come at a very little cost and arguably justify the minor
nettlesome distraction that stakeholder dialogue might produce. 29 Many
companies recognize that heeding at least some interest group concerns can
produce positive changes in corporate practices that promote long-term value
for the corporation. 30 Moving beyond mere short-term shareholder wealth
maximization, increased activism by shareholders may cause a shift toward
"enlightened shareholder value" 31 that takes into account non-monetary
concerns upon which shareholders make actual investment decisions. Thus, for
many corporations, fostering economic success for the corporation over a longer
time horizon remains compatible with-if not dependent upon-meaningful
shareholder and stakeholder dialogue.
27 Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence
from the Business Roundtable Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 157 (2013).28 Christian Hoffmann & Christian Fieseler, Investor Relations Beyond Financials:
Non-financial Factors and Capital Market Image Building, 17 CORP. COMMS.: INT'L J. 138,
146-47 (2012) (providing empirical evidence that equity analysts take into account the
quality of corporate communications with shareholders, corporate governance policies,
socially responsible practices, and image building when assessing the value of a company's
stock).
29 D. A. Jeremy Telman, Is the Quest for Corporate Responsibility a Wild Goose
Chase? The Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 44 AKRON L. REV. 479, 483-84
(2011) ("Corporations seem to recognize the value of permitting social proposals, as they
can provide a relatively inexpensive safety valve for dissent and thus permit the kind of
beneficial exchange between management and shareholders that promotes the legitimacy of
the corporate decisionmaking processes." (footnote omitted)).
30 See, e.g., MALCOLM MCINTOSH & RUTH THOMAS, BRITIsH-N. AM. COMM.,
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS AND CORPORATIONS 42-43 (2002), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/
pdf/bnac_45.pdf (asserting that, with respect to stakeholder challenges at Shell, "These
critical incidents brought into focus ongoing difficulties and convinced senior-level
employees that the company needed to engage more openly with its stakeholders. A series of
high-level negotiations with a range of leading NGOs ensued, illustrating the emerging role
of NGOs as contributors to strategic, long-term change in organisations." (footnote
omitted)); GEORGE PORLE & JEFF HITTNER, IBM GLOBAL Bus. SERVS., ATTAINING
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH THROUGH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2008), available at
http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/gbe030l9-usen-02.pdf.
31 Virginia Harper Ho, "Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 95-111 (2010) (arguing for a
new metric of enlightened shareholder value to measure the efficacy of management
decisions).
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On the opposite side of the spectrum, however, a different set of market
professionals and scholars suggest that shareholder and stakeholder activism
simply distracts corporate managers and ultimately diminishes shareholder
value. For instance, when Greenlight Capital hedge fund manager, David
Einhorn, recently won a battle to have a shareholder proposal placed on the
Apple corporate proxy that would prevent the company from limiting certain
stock options, Apple CEO Tim Cook publicly excoriated Einhorn for creating a
"silly sideshow . . .. This is a waste of shareholder money and a distraction, and
not a seminal issue for Apple." 32 What concerns Cook and other vocal
opponents 33 is the capture of management by special interest groups who do not
possess the company's long-term interests at heart.34 Managers fear
shareholders remain essentially uninformed about the effects of various
propositions on business performance and misuse the proxy access process for
purely personal gain.35 As a result, some corporations adopt a staunchly
adversarial posture towards stakeholder or shareholder engagement, as the prior
example of Chevron suing one of its largest shareholders illustrates.36
32 Poomima Gupta & Edwin Chan, Apple CEO Calls Einhorn Lawsuit "Silly
Sideshow," WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econo
my/apple-ceo-calls-einhorn-lawsuit-silly-sideshow/2013/02/12/0029608c-755e-l l e2-aal2-
e6cfld31106b story.html.
33 See Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck
the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22
AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-par
alyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ (In criticizing Einhorn's attack on Apple, Lipton
stated, "These self-seeking activists are aided and abetted by Harvard Law School Professor
Lucian Bebchuk who leads a cohort of academics who have embraced the concept of
'shareholder democracy' and close their eyes to the real-word effect of shareholder power,
harnessed to activists seeking quick profit, on a targeted company and the company's
employees and other stakeholders. They ignore the fact that it is the stakeholders and
investors with a long-term perspective who are the true beneficiaries of most of the funds
managed by institutional investors.").
34 See Pablo Archel et al., The Institutionalisation of Unaccountability: Loading the
Dice of Corporate Social Responsibility Discourse, 36 ACCT. ORG. & SOC'Y 327, 328 (2011)
(positing that existing modes of stakeholder discourse privilege certain dominant
viewpoints); JAMES R. COPLAND, MANHATTAN INST., PROXY MONITOR 2011: A REPORT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3, 19 (2011), available at
www.proxymonitor.org/Reports/ProxyMonitor_2011 .pdf (suggesting that shareholder
activism provides for "interest-group capture of corporations rather than for mitigating
agency costs and improving shareholder returns"); Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Shareholder
Democracy" Can Mask Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2013/02/25/shareholder-democracy-can-mask-abuses/ (identifying "a perverse
game in which so-called activist investors take to the media to pump or dump stocks in
hopes of creating a fleeting rise or fall in a company's stock price").
35 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006); Bernard S. Sharfinan, Why Proxy
Access Is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387, 405-06 (2012).
36 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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Between absolute antipathy toward stakeholder engagement and effective
dialogue lies an ambiguous middle ground where companies, managers, and
scholars remain uncertain about the ultimate gains derived from shareholder and
stakeholder participation in corporate decision-making. 37 The uncertainty
results from a lack of clear incentives provided to shareholders and managers to
engage in robust discourse that could lead to a mutually beneficial outcome.38
For most shareholders, it is simply not cost effective in the current regulatory
regime to challenge management over business practices, with only the most
strident interest groups vigilant enough to battle for arguably non-quantifiable
moral gains.39 Occupying this middle ground does not necessarily reflect a
rebuke to corporations that engage in discourse with stakeholder groups.
Instead, the middle position entails skepticism about the effectiveness of
discourse among corporate managers, shareholders, and stakeholders. 40 Perhaps
as a result of Citizens United greatly increasing the ability of companies to
affect aggregate political preferences 41 or due to the malleability of shareholder
interests,42 dialogue between companies and shareholders may not actually
produce win-win gains for both sides. 43
B. The Moribund Market for Morality
The glaring inability of corporate law to maintain sufficient integrity in the
collection, reporting, and disclosure of social data portends the collapse of the
37 For a thorough yet early examination of this viewpoint with regard to institutional
investors, see generally Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).
38 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REv. 1255, 1275 (2008) (arguing that shareholders are rationally apathetic regarding
corporate affairs and that proxy rules effectively prohibit shareholders from soliciting proxy
votes in director voting); Tom C.W. Lin, Essay, The Corporate Governance of Iconic
Executives, 87 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 351, 366-68 (2011) (suggesting that investors lack
incentives to engage in informed activism and, as a result, corporate managers possess little
interest in heeding existing activist claims).
39 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 38, at 1275. But see White, supra note I (stating
that at least with respect to placing a shareholder proposal on the corporate proxy, "[u]nder
the SEC's proxy rules, a shareholder with a relatively small investment in a company's
securities has the opportunity to have his or her proposal included in the proxy materials for
an annual meeting right beside management's proposals").
40Ho, supra note 31, at 64-65 (suggesting that early academic optimism regarding
shareholder engagement devolved into pessimism "in the face of considerable evidence of
institutional investor passivity, short-termism, complex and indeed, conflicting interests, and
the limited impact of investor activism on corporate behavior").
41 See infra Part II.C.
42 Archel et al., supra note 34, at 340.
43 Pieter van Beurden & Tobias Gbssling, The Worth of Values-A Literature Review
on the Relation Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance, 82 J. Bus. ETHics
407, 416-17 (2008) (surveying studies that demonstrate neutral or negative relationships
between social discourse, corporate social responsibility, and financial performance).
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CSR market for morality. Even as the world economy suffers, consumers and
investors increasingly take into account a variety of social, environmental, and
ethical considerations in deciding whether to purchase a company's products or
stock. As of May 2012, worldwide owners and managers of assets valued at
more than $32 trillion signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible
Investment, an international compact whereby signatories pledged to screen
investments based on certain environmental, social, and governance issues.44
That $32 trillion value represents an increase of nearly 50% over just the prior
two years.45 In the United States, as of 2012 more than $3.7 trillion gets
invested based on one or more socially responsible investing strategies, marking
a 22% increase since 2009.46
In an efficient market, companies that comply with socially responsible
business practices should receive a premium in stock or product prices from
CSR consumers and investors. Although professional and academic debates
flourish regarding the value of such a CSR premium, 47 substantial evidence
suggests a business case for CSR exists.48 As long as the cost of compliance
4 4 PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 6, at 2.
45 See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 4 (2010) (reporting
around $22 trillion in 2010); see also E. James M. Gifford, Effective Shareholder
Engagement: The Factors that Contribute to Shareholder Salience, 92 J. Bus. ETHICS 79, 79
(Supp. 1 2010).
46 U.S. SIF FOUND., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 2012, at 11 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/
12_TrendsExec_Summary.pdf; GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INV. ALLIANCE, 2012 GLOBAL
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW 2 (2013), available at http://gsiareview2012.gsi-alliance.
org/#/1I/.
47 Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 125-26 (2009).
48 For evidence of a "business case" for CSR that justifies corporate compliance with
consumer and investor preferences, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New
Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REv. 855, 860-64 (2011); see also Archie B. Carroll
& Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of
Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT'L J. MGMT. REVIEWS 85, 95-102 (2010); Marya N.
Cotten & Gail A. Lasprogata, Corporate Citizenship & Creative Collaboration: Best
Practices for Cross-sector Partnerships, 18 J.L. Bus. & ETHICS 9, 13 n.22 (2012); Heather R.
Dixon-Fowler et al., Beyond "Does It Pay To Be Green? " A Meta-analysis of Moderators of
the CEP-CFP Relationship, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 353, 362 (2013); Neil Gunningham,
Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Law and the Limits of Voluntarism, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 476, 498
(Doreen McBamet et al. eds., 2007); Satish Kumar & Ritesh Tiwari, Corporate Social
Responsibility: Insights into Contemporary Research, 10 IUP J. CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan.
2011, at 22, 29 ("Although there are varied views of different researchers as far as the CSR is
concerned, the available literature till date suggests a positive relationship between the
corporate social and financial performance .. . [A] majority of the studies indicate a positive
relationship between these two."); Alison Mackey et al., Corporate Social Responsibility
and Firm Performance: Investor Preferences and Corporate Strategies, 32 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 817, 830-33 (2007); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The
Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARv. Bus.
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does not exceed the CSR premium, corporations realize economic gains by
satisfying the market preferences of CSR-focused consumers and investors. A
properly functioning market in morality should thus produce a Pareto
improvement where all parties enjoy greater welfare.
Current corporate law, however, permits corporations to engage in a kind of
"strategic ambiguity" in social data reporting in order to garner the CSR-
compliance premium without actually embracing socially responsible
practices. 49 Persistent definitional ambiguity regarding what constitutes CSR, a
lack of clear standards for reporting CSR data, corporate "data dumping" of
voluminous irrelevant information, corporate failures to divulge appropriate
data, and corporate "greenwashing" to promote a false image of social
responsibility all contribute to make investors and consumers skeptical about
the ability to monitor whether corporations actually uphold their end of the
bargain in embracing CSR practices. 50 After Citizens United, corporations face
increased incentives to engage in an artful alchemy of mixing otherwise
commercial disclosures with sufficient political content to create an amalgam of
politically tinged corporate speech wholly immune from regulation or
liability.5 ' If corporations enjoy success in manipulating the defects in existing
corporate speech jurisprudence, adherence to that flawed framework threatens
the viability of some of the most socially important regulatory regimes that
target corporate communication (e.g., the securities regulation regime, federal
communications law, federal food and drug regulation, state and federal
antifraud laws, employment law, and workplace safety regulations, to name just
a few). 52 Because corporations cannot repeatedly dissemble over the long run
REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, 83; van Beurden & Gdssling, supra note 43, at 413-16. For contrary
evidence of the absence of a substantial link between financial performance and CSR, see
Roberto Garcia-Castro et al., Does Social Performance Really Lead to Financial
Performance? Accounting for Endogeneity, 92 J. Bus. ETHICS 107, 121 (2010); Philipp
Schreck, Reviewing the Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: New Evidence
and Analysis, 103 J. Bus. ETHICS 167, 183 (2011).
49 The term "strategic ambiguity" refers to the practice of corporations to communicate
"in ways that may not be completely open" in order to protect corporate interests. Eric M.
Eisenberg & Marsha G. Witten, Reconsidering Openness in Organizational Communication,
12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 418,418 (1987); see also Eric M. Eisenberg, Ambiguity as Strategy in
Organizational Communication, 51 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 227,228-30 (1984).
50 Siebecker, supra note 47, at 128-34.
51 For a discussion of the incoherence in the Supreme Court's corporate speech
jurisprudence and the need for a "new institutional" approach to corporate speech rights, see
generally Michael R. Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional" Approach to Corporate
Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247 (2008) [hereinafter Siebecker, Building a New Institutional
Approach]; Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (2006)
[hereinafter Siebecker, Corporate Speech].
52 See Jacob Bunge, Goldstein Presses Free Speech Argument; Others Uncertain,
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3505612 (describing a
hedge fund manager's claim that certain investor solicitation rules under the securities laws
unconstitutionally implicate political speech rights); Siebecker, Corporate Speech, supra
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without detection, shareholders and consumers will fail to pay seemingly CSR-
compliant companies a premium in stock or product price to the extent they
cannot trust the integrity of the CSR-disclosure regime. 53 As a result, the $32
trillion market for morality will eventually crumble.
New corporate law principles predicated upon robust discourse rather than
shareholder wealth maximization could spur a robust discourse regarding the
collection, reporting, and disclosure of CSR data. That discourse could inspire
the necessary sense of trust and integrity in corporate disclosures to sustain the
CSR market, as consumer and investor preferences for socially responsible
business practices continually evolve.
C. Monopolizing Politics
As corporations exercise increasing influence over the political realm
following the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United, existing corporate
law doctrine that permits corporations to ignore various shareholder and
stakeholder interests puts in jeopardy a bedrock sense of legitimacy necessary
for the polity to thrive.
Corporations already occupy a dominant position in our economic and
social lives. On a worldwide scale, the market capitalization of public
companies well exceeds $50 trillion.54 In comparison to sovereign nations, U.S.
corporations represent a majority of the hundred largest global economies, with
independent countries relegated to the lower rungs.55 The sheer mass of wealth
corporations possess makes them exceedingly powerful. But in an effort to
promote or sustain their economic might, corporations play a significant role in
shaping social mores and practices as well. The increased demand for socially
responsible business practices from consumers and investors causes
corporations to embed themselves in communities, or at least to project an
image of social responsibility, in order to garner greater profits or cheaper
access to capital. A recent empirical survey of international business leaders
reflects that more than one half of top corporate managers believe CSR
activities give their companies a competitive advantage. 56 Despite much
note 51, at 656-71 (discussing how granting full First Amendment protection to politically
tinged commercial speech would unravel some of the most important provisions of the
securities laws).
53 Siebecker, supra note 47, at 134-36. For a general description of the problems
associated with corporate greenwashing and its inevitable discovery over time in different
contexts, see Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REv. 983,
984-88 (2011); Richard Dahl, Green Washing: Do You Know What You're Buying?, 118
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A246, A248-50 (2010).
54Mark J. Perry, World Stock Market Capitalization Closes Year at $54.6 Trillion,
AEIDEAS (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/01/world-stock-market-
capitalization-at-54-6-trillion/.
55 Siebecker, supra note 12, at 171.56 POHLE & HITENER, supra note 30, at 3.
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criticism of multinational corporations for excessive influence over society,57
corporations possess a social focus that reinforces the basic profit motive.58
After identifying which social values foster economic growth, corporations
implement external and internal business practices that develop desirable social
norms and behaviors. 59
Despite the potential discomfort caused by the control of corporations over
economic and social spheres, the unchecked and increasing domination of the
political realm represents the primary threat to the basic legitimacy of
democratic processes. Before the decision in Citizens United, many
multinational corporations already rivaled the power of sovereign states by
employing within their vast dominion substantial rulemaking, adjudicative, and
security functions. 60 The resemblance between large corporations and nations
57 See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Sovereignty and Uniformity: The Challenges for
Equal Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, 122 HARV. L. REv. 907, 914-15 (2009).58 POHLE & HITTNER, supra note 30, at I ("A growing body of evidence asserts that
corporations can do well by doing good. Well-known companies have already proven that
they can differentiate their brands and reputations as well as their products and services if
they take responsibility for the well-being of the societies and environments in which they
operate. These companies are practicing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in a manner
that generates significant returns to their businesses."); see also William T. Allen, Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 261, 280
(2008) ("Thus while [corporations] are surely economic and financial instruments, they are,
as well, institutions of social and political significance. The story of the contending
conceptions of the corporation reflects that fact. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to
imagine that this story resonates with an elemental tension that our society has endured since
the days of the industrial revolution.").
59 Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 549,
561-62 (2002) ("[T]he nature of modem war highlights the fact that business corporations
are not only abstract economic entities but social institutions. As organized institutions
composed of human beings, they have moral and political as well as economic
responsibilities. Like states, business corporations must therefore develop their own foreign
and domestic policies, either implicitly and unconsciously or, much better, explicitly and
with awareness. This does not mean that large, global corporations should appoint new vice
presidents of war or defense, but it does require corporate leaders to take the larger global
issues of war and peace seriously from a moral as well as an economic perspective. In a
'postnational' world, business corporations can no longer simply rely on nation-states to take
care of problems of international security, if, indeed, they ever could delegate this
responsibility entirely."); see also Eddie A. Jauregui, The Citizenship Harms of Workplace
Discrimination, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 347, 362 (2007).
60 See Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REv. 129, 132
(2008) ("[T]he distinction between corporations and the state is blurring, not only
internationally, but also domestically, as corporations act in ways that make them similar to
nation-states. The nation-state is not dead, but it is evolving. A pivotal factor in this
evolution is the power of the world's largest corporations. Like the vassal whose power
overshadows the king's, these companies act similarly to traditional nation-states in some
ways. They have tremendous economic power, establish security forces, engage in
diplomatic, adjudicatory and 'legislative' activities, and influence monetary policy."); see
also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV.
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certainly signals an evolutionary shift in the nature of the firm from its origins
as a simple vehicle for generating wealth. Decisions governing some of the
most important aspects of our lives now get made within the confidential
confines of the boardroom rather than in the public sphere.
If the decision in Citizens United enables corporations to dominate public
opinion or set the agenda on matters left open to public debate, the ability to
control the corporation represents the ability to control political life. In an odd
twist, corporations can use Citizens United both as a sword and a shield. They
can pierce deeply into the political realm and potentially dominate political
discourse while shielding themselves from liability in a variety of regulatory
settings by commingling corporate communications with some minimal
political content.61 In the 2012 election cycle, corporations spent a record $2.5
billion trying to sway voters' opinions, although it remains unclear if corporate
political activity positively correlates with enhanced shareholder value.62
Regardless of whether political action actually enhances profits, the
mechanisms for determining the manner in which corporations enter into the
political foray remain of paramount concern. In American society, the essential
legitimacy of government rests on transparent democratic processes that ensure
elected officials represent the will of the governed. Although corporations
remain distinct from polities, to the extent corporations encroach into territory
once wholly occupied by government and to the extent the decision in Citizens
United enables corporations to dominate even more effectively the political
realm, the legitimacy of the polity remains inextricably tethered to the
legitimacy of corporate decision-making. Within the current corporate law
structure predicated upon shareholder wealth maximization, however, no
processes for robust and transparent democratic deliberation exist. 63
1285, 1308-09 (2003) (discussing how multinational corporations have increasingly
encroached on the authority of states).
61 As I have posited in another series of articles, embracing a new institutional
approach to corporate speech would provide a coherent and rigorous framework to justify
limitations on corporate speech in certain important institutional settings. See Siebecker,
Corporate Speech, supra note 51, at 616-21; Siebecker, Building a New Institutional
Approach, supra note 51, at 289-3 04.
6 2 Eduardo Porter, Get What You Pay For? Not Always, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/business/pitfalls-of-spending-on-politics.html?pagewa
nted=all&_r-0; see also Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC
& Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.orgbigpicture/blio.php?cycle=2012 (last visited
Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting the highest level of business spending in biannual elections since
2000).
6 3 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv.
675,688 (2007); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy,
69 Omo ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2008) [hereinafter Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe]; Roger
Lowenstein, A Seat at the Table, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/maga
zine/07wwln-lede-t.html (last updated June 21, 2009) ("Only the management (or its
handpicked board) chooses nominees, and it is an iron rule of American corporations that
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Calling for greater democratization of the corporation represents nothing
terribly odd or particularly new. Many argue that giving greater voice to
shareholders and others affected by corporate decisions would ensure corporate
decisions remain more accurately aligned with the interests of corporate
constituencies. 64 The decision in Citizens United simply fuels the fire for
enhancing shareholder suffrage. Some suggest the need for transparent
disclosure of corporate political activities and shareholder approval, whether as
a result of basic contract theory65 or because corporate political spending
represents a form of impermissible compelled political speech by
shareholders. 66 Although greater democratization of the corporation represents a
shared repercussion of a new discourse theory of the firm, discourse theory
targets with philosophical and descriptive rigor both the foundations and
mechanisms for legitimate action in a way that encompasses not only the
interests of shareholders but all constituencies affected by corporate actions.
Absent a corporate law framework structured upon a foundation of robust
discourse, domination of the political sphere by corporations does violence to
the sense of legitimacy essential to sustain our democratic values.
III. BRIDGING THE IMPASSE THROUGH CORPORATE DISCOURSE
A new "discourse theory" of the firm can help solve the systemic problems
concerning the appropriate role of shareholders and other stakeholders in
corporate governance, the viability of the $32 trillion market for CSR, and the
basic legitimacy of corporate decision-making as corporations increasingly
dominate the political realm. Existing theories of the firm predicated upon a
stilted and static principle of shareholder wealth maximization neither
accurately describe nor coherently shape the actual practices of modern
corporations and the extant dynamic relationship between corporations,
shareholders, stakeholders, and other important social institutions. In contrast, a
discourse theory of the firm provides a more descriptively accurate account of
modern corporations as they exist and offers a normatively superior framework
for solving knotty corporate law problems.67
ballots should not contain more nominees than seats. In the former U.S.S.R., this style of
democracy endured for only 72 years. In American business it is timeless.").
6 4 See STEPHEN BoTTOMLEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION: RETHINKING
CORPoRATE GOVERNANCE 115-17 (2007); Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe, supra note
63, at 55; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 129, 149-52
(2009).
65 Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 765, 806-30 (2013).
66 Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497,499 (2011).
67 See WILLIAM OUTHWAITE, HABERMAS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 109, 120 (1994);
R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Interest, and
Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of Habermas' Theory of
Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1957-58 (1996).
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A. Blueprints for a Discourse Theory of the Firm
As a philosophical framework, discourse theory reveals how robust rules
for deliberation can enhance the effectiveness of organizational structures and
provide legitimacy to institutional decisions. Based on the collected works of
political philosopher Jiirgen Habermas, a new discourse theory of the firm
requires corporations to adopt rules and incentives that promote autonomous
expression of ideas, fair and equal participation of parties affected by corporate
decisions, respectful consideration of expressed viewpoints, and the ability to
change previously held positions through continual discourse. 68 The first
article in this series spelled out in great detail the general philosophical
construct of discourse theory.69 Rather than simply regurgitate previously
covered ground, a brief recapitulation of the basic tenets of discourse theory
provides a sufficient background for exploring new territory regarding the legal
standard and modes of discourse necessary to implement the theory.70
First, the bedrock foundation of discourse theory involves a distinction
between communicative action and strategic behavior. Communicative action
represents discourse aimed at a common goal. 71 In contrast, strategic action
arises when actors attempt to reach selfish outcomes through weapons, goods,
threats, or enticements. 72 Defined that way, engaging in communicative action
68 See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 118-31 (William Rehg trans.,
MIT Press 1996) (1992) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS]; JORGEN HABERMAS,
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 76-98 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry
Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983) [hereinafter HABERMAS, MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS]; I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, REASON
AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)
(1981) [hereinafter HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1]; 2 JORGEN HABERMAS,
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF
FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981); JORGEN
HABERMAS, ON THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION (Maeve Cooke ed., 1998).
69 See Siebecker, supra note 12, at 198-208.
70See infra Parts IV-V. For additional works suggesting democratic deliberation
should apply in some corporate contexts, see generally Anupam Chander, Googling
Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (2011); Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate
Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1273, 1278-86 (2009);
MaryAnn Reynolds & Kristi Yuthas, Moral Discourse and Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting, 78 J. Bus. ETHICS 47, 53-62 (2008); Helen Wadham, Talking Across Boundaries:
Business and NGO Perspectives on CSR, Sustainable Development and Partnership, 34 J.
CORP. CITIZENSHIP 57, 59-60 (2009).
71 HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1, supra note 68, at 307-08; see also
Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and Rights,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1163, 1168-69 (1995) (book review) ("In communicative action, on the
other hand, actors are oriented toward reaching a common understanding rather than
achieving personal success. The model for communicative action is that of an idealized
community of scientists gathered together to ascertain the truth of a scientific hypothesis.")
(footnote omitted).
72 See HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 68, at 133-34.
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necessarily involves an implied commitment to eschew selfish promotion of
specific results and to accept ground rules that promote full, fair, and rational
discourse among the parties engaged.73 Although Habermas focuses primarily
on deliberation within formal governmental institutions, communicative action
also occurs in non-governmental institutions, including associations, interest
groups, and corporations. 74 The following section identifies some of the most
prominent aspects of modern corporate practices that involve communicative
action, and thus, a commitment to moral discourse rather than strategic
behavior.75
Second, the "discourse principle" guides effective deliberation within any
instance of communicative action. The principle mandates recognizing the
rights of affected parties to participate in discourse. 76 In the absence of coercion
of any kind, the discourse principle requires giving participants the right to
introduce desired propositions, to challenge expressed viewpoints, and to
change positions over time through continual discourse.77 Though certainly an
aspirational set of criteria for ideal deliberation, the discourse principle
represents a set of procedural mechanisms to ensure just outcomes. 78
Third, transparency and accountability represent tandem core components
of proper discourse. 79 Deliberative secrecy undermines the ability of affected
parties to challenge propositions or introduce alternatives.80 Constituencies
cannot effectively understand why a particular decision resulted without
knowing the path deliberations actually followed.8' Moreover, without
transparency, accountability remains illusive, for it remains impossible to hold
parties accountable for deliberative failures without knowing the positions and
strategies parties actually adopted within the debate.82
Fourth, legitimacy occupies a central role in discourse theory. For
individuals engaged in communicative action to accept themselves as bound by
73 1d. at 134; Rosenfeld, supra note 71, at 1169 ("Habermas argues that the very
agreement to engage in communicative action implies a voluntary submission to certain
normative constraints embedded in the discursive practice itself. Thus, given an equal
opportunity to present arguments and a genuine commitment to being persuaded only by the
force of the better argument in a rational discussion, actors engaged in communicative action
would only accept as legitimate those action norms upon which all those possibly affected
would agree together to embrace on the basis of good reasons." (footnote omitted)).
74 Rainey & Rehg, supra note 67, at 1963-64; Siebecker, supra note 12, at 201.
75 See infra Part IV.B.
76 JAMEs GORDON FINLAYSON, HABERMAS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 43-44
(2005); HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 68, at 108-09.
77 FINLAYSON, supra note 76, at 43; HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note
68, at 89.
78 See FINLAYSON, supra note 76, at 44.
79 See Jones, supra note 70, at 1285.
8 0 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 95
(1996).
81 See Jones, supra note 70, at 1285.
82 See id.
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the various rules for morally acceptable discourse, participants must see
themselves as authors of the rules themselves. 83 Even if the discourse produces
outcomes at odds with any particular individual's preferences, the deliberative
processes that gave rise to the outcomes must garner common acceptance. 84 The
tenets of discourse theory, then, must garner rational appreciation of the
procedural correctness and justice of the deliberative mechanisms employed.85
To the extent the procedures inspire full, fair, and equal participation among
affected parties, the sense of legitimacy should obtain.86
Following that brief recapitulation of the basic tenets of discourse theory,
understanding how corporations engage in communicative action represents the
next step in building a new discourse theory of the firm. For only if corporations
pursue communicative action in various contexts do the tacit moral
commitments for just rules of discourse come into play.
B. Communicative Action and the Corporation
Many of the most important functions of public corporations constitute
instances of communicative action. The basic fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders, the election of directors by shareholders, the shareholder proxy
proposal process, and the mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements
embedded in the securities laws all involve detailed communication among
corporations, shareholders, and other public constituencies to achieve specific
goals.87 In essence, those fundamental corporate practices entail corporate
communicative actions that should require a moral commitment to full and fair
discourse within each context considered.
Before examining more fully how each of those corporate practices
represents communicative action, however, gaining a slightly better
understanding of the amenability of corporate law to discourse theory seems
essential. After all, it might seem a bit odd to apply rules of discourse to govern
83 See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 68, at 454 ("The addressees of law
would not be able to understand themselves as its authors if the legislator were to discover
human rights as pregiven moral facts that merely need to be enacted as positive law.").
84 See Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be Reconciled Through
Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas's Proceduralist Paradigm of Law, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 805 (1996).
85 See id. ("[T]he legitimacy of law is to be gauged from the standpoint of a collectivity
of strangers who mutually recognize one another as equals and jointly engage in
communicative action to establish a legal order to which they could all accord their
unconstrained acquiescence. By means of communicative action, a reconstructive process is
established through which the relevant group of strangers need only accept as legitimate
those laws which they would all agree both to enact as autonomous legislators and to follow
as law abiding subjects.").
86William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide, and Critique, 23
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 969,992 (1998).
87 See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits ofDefault
Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 78-79 (2005); see also infra Parts I.B.1-3.
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corporate practices given the ostensibly dominant profit-making motive of
corporations.88 Many scholars already focus on the importance of
institutionalizing robust dialogue within corporate settings and apply formal
discourse theory to corporate law problems. 89 Habermas, however, raised some
concern that corporations could play a healthy role in promoting and sustaining
fair discourse. 90 Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the argument that
massive corporate wealth distorts public debate, 91 the fear is that concentration
of massive wealth and power within the corporate stronghold would render the
playing field so uneven as to make fair deliberation about any matter
impossible. 92 Implicitly rejecting the limitations Habermas might have placed
on the contexts in which his theory might thrive, scholars still suggest that
robust discourse within corporate structures can enhance the quality of debate at
the societal level. 93 That corporations possess extreme wealth, potentially
destroying the possibility for fair discourse, simply spurs the need to apply
88 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 655-66 (2010); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547,
549 (2003).
89 See, e.g., Angus Corbett & Peta Spender, Corporate Constitutionalism, 31 SYDNEY
L. REv. 147, 154 (2009); Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory
for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REv. 771, 773-74 (2007); Fairfax,
Making the Corporation Safe, supra note 63, at 55.
90 HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 68, at 350 ("The constitutional structure of
the political system is preserved only if government officials hold out against corporate
bargaining partners and maintain the asymmetrical position that results from their obligation
to represent the whole of an absent citizenry, whose will is embodied in the wording of the
statutes."); see also JORGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL
ESSAYS 117 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., Polity Press 2001) (1998); Rosemary J. Coombe &
Jonathan Cohen, The Law and Late Modern Culture: Reflections on Between Facts and
Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1029,
1046 (1999) ("Habermas, like many contemporary constitutional theorists, clearly recognizes
the dangers of corporate control and concentration of ownership, and the effects of free
market principles in limiting the cultural resources, information, and modes of
argumentation available. to us in a consumer society.").
91 See Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 348-49 (2010).9 2 See Akilah N. Folami, From Habermas to "Get Rich or Die Tryin ": Hip Hop, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235,
240-41 (2007).
9 31d. at 241 ("Scholars such as David Skover, Rosemary Coombe, Kenneth Aoki and
others have explored the ways in which the market, the mass media, and even commodified
identities can be used as a source and basis of political resistance to the larger public
discourse. In fact, they have argued that failing to acknowledge, as Habermas does, such
sites as spaces of contestation simply misses the mark when analyzing how individuals of
the current, post-modernist, 21st century, consumer-oriented, mass-mediated, society form
views about themselves and others, which in turn shapes their political identities and
expressions.").
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discourse theory principles to correct the imbalance. 94 Thus, mitigating the
negative effects of excessive corporate wealth on public debate requires
rendering internal corporate decision-making processes consistent with
discourse theory.95
Following that logic, the import of structuring internal corporate rules
around discourse stems from the relationship between the corporation and the
state. 96 After Citizens United, the influence of corporations in shaping public
opinion, dominating political debate, and affecting the outcome of elections will
continue to grow.97 As a result, corporate law needs to embrace robust rules for
full and fair discourse that engender a sense of legitimacy in the political
realm.98 Because the private boardroom in many ways replaces the public
sphere in which political decisions get made, ensuring a minimal sense of
legitimacy in the political system may very well require giving corporate
94 See Coombe & Cohen, supra note 90, at 1039 ("By excluding realms of private law
and market forces from the space he regards as political, the model of democracy Habermas
provides would keep existing allocations of communicative power intact while entrenching
corporate dominance over realms of public communication."); see also Tonia Novitz & Phil
Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the Making of Transnational Labour Law: The
Durability of Corporatism, 35 INDUS. L.J. 367, 373 (2006) ("Nevertheless, it is possible to
distinguish corporatism from deliberative democratic theory in at least three respects. Firstly,
deliberative democracy, at least in the form proposed by Jilrgen Habermas, indicates that
policy-making should be responsive to groupings of all interests which spontaneously
emerge within civil society, and like pluralism, calls into question the privileged
representation of management and labour under corporatist structures.").
95 Rosenfeld, supra note 71, at 1175 ("Actually, Habermas accepts the inevitability of
the administrative state with its bureaucracy, large corporate organizations, and dominant
mass media. . . . In other words, if a law can be reconstructed through the discourse principle
counterfactual as being genuinely self-imposed pursuant to a consensus among all those who
come under its sweep, then any rational actor must acknowledge its normative validity.
Consistent with this, Habermas's proceduralist paradigm does not predetermine the content
of any legitimate law but merely lays down the procedural requirement that laws satisfy the
discourse principle to establish their normative validity.").
96 Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 21 n.67 (2006); Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and
Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 471, 483 n.74 (2005).
97 See infra Part IV.C.
98 Gabriel Motzkin, Habermas 's Ideal Paradigm of Law, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1431,
1435 (1996) ("While institutionalizing the protection of the rights of the citizenry poses a
difficult and never-ending problem, institutionalizing the active powers of the citizenry as
lords and overseers of the political order is an even more difficult problem. Here the
recourse to the apparently extra legal-public sphere serves Habermas well: a radicalization of
his proposal would be one which would strip current semipublic bodies of their anonymity
and informality and endow the semipublic bodies of a corporate citizenry with analogous
powers. The recipe, then, is that of democratizing corporate power and its transformed
application outside of the sphere to which it has been previously confined. Against the
objection that such a democratization would wound the apparent inviolacy of individual
rights, Habermas's analysis concludes that such an inviolacy of individual rights is only
apparent and theoretical. Individual rights are already dead. The question is how to revitalize
them.").
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constituencies a more meaningful voice regarding the political positions
corporations pursue.99
Thus, with the inevitable melding of the corporate and political worlds
cemented by the decision in Citizens United, the need for a discourse theory of
the firm comes both from external concerns about the justice of our political
system and from internal concerns regarding the effective modes of corporate
organization. Both the external and internal motivators for enhanced discourse
need to take into consideration the evolving nature of the firm and its
relationship to shareholders and other affected constituencies.100 Although
strong arguments exist for relying on discourse theory to restructure internal
corporate governance rules in order to provide a more efficient and
descriptively accurate account of how corporations and shareholders actually
relate to each other, the need to maintain legitimacy in our democracy provides
a special impetus for revisiting the basic theories upon which corporate
jurisprudence rests.
1. Fiduciary Duties
Fulfilling the basic duties of care and loyalty that ensure directors and
officers act on behalf of shareholders represents a clear instance of
communicative action directed toward proper corporate governance. The duties
of care and loyalty arise out of essential fiduciary bonds of trust. 101 Only
through legal obligations of trust can shareholders feel protected from the self-
interest of corporate managers who might use business assets or opportunities
for their own personal gain, rather than for the good of the ultimate owners of
the company.102
99 See Corbett & Spender, supra note 89, at 149-50 (describing a corporate
constitutionalism that relies on greater deliberation within the corporate setting to ensure a
sense of legitimacy in the polity).
10oSee BOTTOMLEY, supra note 64, at 12 (suggesting that greater discourse with the
corporate setting remains essential to ensure accountability, deliberation, and contestability);
see also Corbett & Spender, supra note 89, at 150 ("(1) Accountability-corporate decision-
making processes should be characterised by a separation of decision-making powers. (2)
Deliberation-corporate decisions should be subject to deliberation. (3) Contestability-
corporate decisions which do not track the interests of members should be readily
contestable.").
101 See Richard N. Ottaway, Defining Trust in Fiduciary Responsibilities, in THE ETHICS
OF ACCOUNTING & FINANCE: TRUST, RESPONSIBILITY, AND CONTROL 3, 3 (W. Michael
Hoffman et al. eds., 1996) ("In some ways, there is no role in fiduciary relationships other
than trust."); Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 211, 256-65
(2006); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance ofBeing Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REv. 591, 614-
17 (2001) (discussing the essential nexus between trust and fiduciary relationships).
10 2 See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS FROM ENRON TO REFORM 246-310 (2006); Leslie, supra note 87, at 76-80
(discussing the evolution and basic role of fiduciary duties under corporate law).
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Fulfilling trust, however, cannot occur inside an intellectual vacuum.
Properly understood, trust in the context of corporate fiduciary duties reflects a
rational expectation by shareholders that corporate managers take into account,
or encapsulate, shareholder interests when deciding what corporate action to
pursue.103 No such rational expectation can occur without some incentives-
legal or otherwise-for corporate managers to assess effectively the actual
interests of shareholders.104
Neoclassical law and economic theory simply assumes that shareholders
remain primarily focused on short-term wealth maximization.105 But that theory
of shareholder identity based on a wholly stylized and stilted notion of human
rationality receives fast criticism as unmoored in reality. 106 In making decisions,
real individuals take into account a variety of interests (such as familial
relationships, friendships, health, ethics, and moral values) that are not readily
converted into a monetary metric.107 As the $32 trillion CSR market
demonstrates, 0 8 actual shareholders value more than simple short-term wealth
gains. In swiftly increasing numbers, shareholders (and consumers) take into
account a variety of social, environmental, ethical, and political criteria in
deciding whether to purchase a company's stock (or products).109 Although
some shareholders may indeed focus on short-term wealth maximization, that
characterization does not describe accurately all shareholders or their interests.
To the extent shareholders possess interests that target the rights or concerns of
other stakeholder groups, taking account of those ancillary stakeholder interests
as well remains necessary to gain a proper understanding of shareholder
preferences.
The ability to trust sensibly that corporate managers encapsulate
shareholder interests depends on a sort of due diligence."l 0 Quite simply,
shareholders must be able to expect that officers and directors take into account
the values that shareholders actually possess in deciding what path the
corporation should follow. Though certainly not requiring managers to heed
every shareholder interest, the fiduciary bond requires at least an effort at
identification. 1 Simply assuming that shareholder interests remain tethered to
wealth maximization represents an addled approach that ignores empirical
103 See RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 10 (2002); Russell Hardin, Do
We Want Trust in Government?, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 22, 26 (Mark E. Warren ed.,
1999); Siebecker, supra note 47, at 150.
104 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 152-54 (discussing Hardin's notion of competence
as an essential component of the trust relationship).
105 See Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1629,
1657 (2006).
106 See id; Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic
Analysis ofLaw, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2001).
10 7 See Williams, supra note 105, at 1657; see also Kysar, supra note 106, at 4-5.
108 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109 See supra Part II.B.
110 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 152-54.
111Id
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evidence and the increasingly loud collective voices of shareholders who claim
different preferences.11 2 For trust to flourish and the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to endure as meaningful concepts, a continual dialogue between
shareholders and managers must take place. 113 That reflexive dialogue no doubt
represents a form of communicative action that should then comport with the
tenets of discourse theory. The discussion in the next Part articulates the legal
standards for enforcing the dialogue and the modes of discourse that
corporations could employ to satisfy their obligations.11 4 Recognizing that
fulfilling the bedrock fiduciary duties of care and loyalty requires
communicative action, however, represents a necessary step in advancing a new
discourse theory of the firm.
2. Proxy Solicitation and Shareholder Proposals
The solicitation of shareholder votes through the corporate proxy entails
another obvious example of communicative action directed at good
governance."t 5 The election of directors by shareholders serves as one of the
primary pillars of corporate law.116 For public companies, the U.S. securities
laws and regulations require corporations to submit a vast amount of detailed
information to shareholders in order to provide an adequate basis for making
informed decisions.' 7 Those disclosures remain subject to stringent antifraud
provisions that attempt to bolster the integrity of the electoral process."t 8
Beyond the election of directors, shareholders vote on a variety of other
extraordinary measures, often including among other matters, mergers,
consolidations, changes to the corporate charter, and sale of all or substantially
all of the company's assets. Each of those instances of voting entails mandated
communication by the company to facilitate the shareholder voting decision.' 19
112 For a discussion of the need to assess the actual preferences and profiles of diverse
stakeholders in corporate law, see Helen Anderson, Creditors' Rights of Recovery:
Economic Theory, Corporate Jurisprudence and the Role of Fairness, 30 MELB. U. L. REV.
1,24-25 (2006).
113 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 169-71.
I14 See infra Part IV.
115 See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and
Shareholder Access to the Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339 (discussing the historical
relationship between shareholder activism and corporate governance).
l6 See Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should
Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling ofEconomic and Voting Rights?, 55 VLL. L. REV. 93,
94(2010).
I17See Siebecker, Corporate Speech, supra note 51, at 655.
118 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.3 (5th ed. 2005)
(describing a variety of anti-fraud regulations embedded in the securities laws); ROBERTA
ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 301 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
119 For a description of shareholder voting rights and procedures, see LISA M. FAIRFAX,
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 7-
27 (2011).
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In addition, pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8, shareholders enjoy the right to
place on the corporate proxy various proposals related to the company's
business practices, governance rights, and other matters of substantial
importance to the corporation.120 Although significant limitations exist on the
subject matter of the proposals and corporations oppose shareholder proposals
that eventually find their way to the corporate proxy, shareholders nonetheless
exercise their proxy proposal rights with increasing frequency. 121 That
shareholder proposals do not appear on the ultimate proxy does not betoken a
failed proposal. Instead, instigating a proposal often leads to reflective discourse
with corporate managers and ends in a negotiated settlement regarding a change
in corporate policies or practices. 122 Regarding those proposals that actually
appear for general consideration by shareholders, the proxy contains both a
supporting statement from the proposing shareholder and a statement from
management in opposition.123 The process involves an extremely limited but
pointed exchange of viewpoints for consideration among the shareholders
qualified to vote on the matter. 124
Shareholder voting on election of directors and other matters closely
resembles the election of government officials and referenda processes typical
in democracy.125 The processes of electing representatives to govern our
collective lives and change laws through public referenda constitute exercises in
sustained discourse. That discourse involves not just the provision of
information about the final question upon which the ultimate vote occurs, but
also a sustained discourse about who stands for office and what issues find their
way onto the ballot.126
The primary role of discourse in the voting process does not change when
the context shifts from politics to corporate organization and behavior.
Certainly, members of corporate boards do not serve in the same capacity as
U.S. Senators. But as corporations increasingly dominate our economic, social,
and political lives, election to the board of a Fortune 100 company may be of
much greater aggregate importance than who serves as county clerk in an
isolated rural area. 127 Moreover, with respect to the formal electoral
constituency of shareholders, the discourse with corporations remains highly
regulated and includes penalties for misstatements or omissions. 128 The notion
is not to suggest that the protection the First Amendment affords to even false
speech in the political arena is misplaced. Instead, the observation intends to
120 See id. at 63-84.
121 See U.S. SIF FOUND., supra note 46.
122 See FAIRFAX, supra note 119, at 82-83.
123 See id. at 64-66.
124 See id.
125 See Lee, supra note 64, at 151-52.126 BOTTOMLEY, supra note 64, at 115-17.
127Id. at 118-19, 177-78.
128 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2012); see also Siebecker,
Corporate Speech, supra note 51, at 663-64.
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underscore the centrality and import of discourse in the corporate context as
well. Just as in the political sphere, the process of election and referenda in the
corporate setting represent instances of communicative action designed at
achieving good governance.129
Under the panoply of state and federal laws governing the corporate
electoral system, the discourse remains quite unidirectional from the
corporation to shareholders, without sufficient ability of shareholders or other
stakeholders to set the agenda or exercise choice regarding who stands for
election.130 In contrast to prevailing corporate law doctrine, a discourse theory
of the firm would better account for the centrality of dialogue to the ballot
process and ensure greater fairness and effectiveness to that particular form of
corporate communicative action.
3. Mandatory Disclosure and Reporting
The system of mandatory disclosure of and reporting by public companies
of quantitative and qualitative data represents yet another clear example of
communicative action. The securities laws, and the SEC rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, provide an incredibly intricate scheme for the
collection, reporting, and dissemination of corporate information.131 Whether in
the context of quarterly or annual reports, proxy solicitation, or public offerings
of securities, the securities laws compel companies to disclose not just hard
financial data but soft qualitative information regarding the company's code of
ethics,132 business operations,133 competitive risks,134 legal proceedings,135
internal controls over financial data,136 executive compensation policies,137 and
management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) of the company's financial
conditions and operations.138
The vast mandatory disclosure system intends to provide integrity and trust
in the capital markets. The backbone of the securities regulation regime
emerged in the aftermath of the stock market crash in 1929, itself a result of a
lack of adequate transparency and veracity of information companies publicly
disclosed.139 More recent corporate scandals continue to produce new securities
12 9 See Fairfax, supra note 89, at 773-74. See generally Brown, supra note 115.
130 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FiNANCIAL
CRisis 233-36 (2012).
131 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301-.302 (2012).
132 Id § 229.406.
133 Id § 229.101.
134 Id § 229.305.
135 Id § 229.103.
136 Id § 229.308.
137 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.403-.405.
138 Id § 229.303.
139 HAzEN, supra note 118, at 14-15; LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 35-36 (5th ed. 2004).
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regulation initiatives that hope to correct persistent flaws in the communication
by corporations to consumers and investors. 140 Despite those efforts to stem the
tide of corruption, a corporate hubris still spurs what seems a systemic
dissembling.
The project here is not to recount the various corporate scandals and their
effects on the capital markets in the United States and around the world.
Instead, the intent is merely to demonstrate that the incredibly broad system of
securities regulation centers on communication between public companies and
the market. Despite strict regulation through a host of antifraud protections, the
quality of communication seems woefully inadequate to secure the expressed
historical goals of the securities regulations themselves. A spate of corporate
scandals and a crisis of confidence in the capital markets endure.141
Curing the communication defect requires an approach that adopts a less
unidirectional focus. Current securities regulations almost exclusively focus on
communication from the corporation to the public, but do not address the degree
to which corporations should-and in what way-solicit the opinions of the
market.142 That side of the conversation seems left to invisible market
incentives. Absent plucky shareholders or stakeholder groups who value the
changes they advocate more than the cost of expressing their viewpoints and
securing change, the securities laws provide little impetus for public input in
corporate conversations. Similarly, the securities laws leave to corporations to
determine the extent to which, if at all, managers take into account market
preferences in determining the content, timing, and dissemination of
information relevant to certain consumers and investors.143 Rather than
facilitating an ongoing dialogue between corporations and the constituencies
they serve, the securities laws remain significantly entrenched in a view of the
corporation as promoting a profit-maximizing institution that would not benefit
from discourse.144 The static regime of securities regulation simply requires
corporations to spew specific tidbits of information that a mythical "reasonable"
investor would find relevant in making a decision to purchase a company's
140 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-3, 78j-4,
781, 78n-1 (2012)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2012)); Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111
(2012)); Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012)); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L.
No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012));
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2012)); Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803
(repealed 2005).
141 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 130, at 3-15.
142 1d. at 255-58.
143 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 118-19.
144 Siebecker, Corporate Speech, supra note 51, at 651-71.
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stock.145 That stance seems particularly backwards because the securities
regulation regime operates mostly through the regulation of compelled speech
designed to promote the collective goal of integrity in the capital markets.146 As
such, the system of mandatory disclosure and periodic reporting represents an
obvious form of communicative action that should require some more robust
principles of discourse to ensure achieving those goals. Recognizing the
securities regulation regime as a complex form of communicative action would
help guide the evolution of securities regulation in a manner that might better
stave the ongoing onslaught of challenges to the basic integrity of the capital
markets.
IV. STANDARDS FOR ENFORCING CORPORATE COMMUNICATION
The serious maladies plaguing corporate law diagnosed at the outset of this
Article stem from anemic existing corporate law principles incapable of
attending accurately to the evolving nature of the firm and the role shareholders
and other stakeholders should play in corporate governance. The systemic
failures involving instances of corporate communicative action lie at the core of
prevailing business theory and practice. Thus, the healing process for currently
diseased corporate law doctrine must begin with a regimen of enhanced
discourse in contexts of corporate communicative action. As discussed earlier
regarding the blueprints for a discourse theory of the firm, the goal is to provide
rules and incentives that promote autonomous expression of ideas, fair and
equal participation of parties affected by corporate decisions, respectful
consideration of expressed viewpoints, and the ability to change previously held
positions through continual discourse.147 Using the discourse principle as an
overarching guide, the legal standards should promote enhanced engagement,
transparency, accountability, and ultimately legitimacy.
Admittedly, the standards proposed do not fully implement an ideal
discourse. That should engender pragmatic confidence rather than a sense of
ultimate failure. For the standards proposed do not rest on a revolutionary spirit
but instead attempt to instantiate rules that accommodate the reality of the world
we actually inhabit. The goal in this Article is not to make perfect the enemy of
the good, and as a result, the standards promoted could fit very easily within
existing corporate law constructs. With that caveat in mind, standards for
implementing a new discourse theory for the firm can take place on a variety of
legal fronts including common law, statutes, administrative rules, and non-
governmental standards. Of course, implementing rules and incentives that
would more effectively realize a new discourse theory of the firm would ideally
take place on all legal fronts. But adopting robust discourse standards in any of
145 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REv. 678, 694-95 (2013).
146 For a full discussion of how the securities regulations compel and restrict speech to
insure market integrity, see Siebecker, Corporate Speech, supra note 51, at 651-71.147 See supra Part III.A.
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those legal forums would at least diminish the ill effects of a diseased regime
under which corporations, shareholders, and other stakeholders currently suffer.
In the end, adopting new standards for enhanced discourse in corporate law
should not trigger fear of radical change.148 Instead, structuring new corporate
doctrine around discourse principles simply provides both a more descriptively
accurate account of how corporations actually behave in modem society and a
normatively superior framework for addressing novel questions of law as the
corporation and its constituencies continually evolve.
A. Common Law
Common law mechanisms targeting the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
represent perhaps the least intrusive, yet most effective, means to spur robust
discourse. With respect to the duty of care, the change would require
reinterpreting the presumptive blanket protection currently afforded board
decisions under the "business judgment rule." 49 As currently conceived, the
rule insulates directors from liability for poor business choices, as long as the
decisions did not involve fraud, illegality, a conflict of interest, or gross
negligence (which can include wholly irrational or wasteful decisions). 50
Corporate managers enjoy extraordinary protection from liability in the absence
of the situations that destroy the umbrella of protection the presumption
provides.' 5' Instances in which courts impose liability represent legal "blips"
where board members simply act precipitously without minimally adequate
information, reflection, or questioning of the basis for business decisions.1 52
The common law change would require interpreting the gross negligence
exception to include a failure to require some minimal discourse with
shareholders to ensure the board took the actual interests shareholders possess
into account. In essence, it would reflect a proper understanding of the notion of
trust that undergirds the very notion of a fiduciary duty. Trust cannot exist
without a rational expectation that those in whom we bestow our trust
encapsulate in some minimal way our actual interests. 153 As discussed above,
shareholders could not rationally expect corporate managers to take their
148 See Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 Aluz. ST. L.J. 717, 735-54 (2010)
(discussing an incremental approach to securing greater shareholder say in governance by
working within existing legal structures).
149 For a general discussion of the business judgment rule in the context of shareholder
democracy, see Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business
Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
1,3(2010).
I50 See Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware's Broken Duty of
Care, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 319, 324-25; Michael R. Siebecker, The Duty of Care and
Data Control Systems in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 821, 825-26
(2010).
151 Siebecker, supra note 150.
1521d
153See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 158-60.
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interests into account when making business decisions unless the board
members engage in some basic effort at identifying what interests the actual
shareholders of the company possess.154 By simply assuming all shareholders
desire short-term wealth maximization, corporate actors cannot fulfill any
sensible construct of trust. Instead, corporate managers would need to conduct
some minimal due diligence to discern the variety and intensity of shareholder
interests.s55 And to the extent shareholders possess preferences regarding
matters that concern other corporate stakeholders (e.g., working conditions of
overseas laborers, environmental practices, non-discrimination employment
standards, etc.), that minimal due diligence would require assessing certain
stakeholder interests as well.156
What makes a failure to engage in this minimal due diligence a matter of
gross negligence (and arguably waste) is the effect that failing to take into
account the manifest preferences of actual shareholders and stakeholders would
have on the viability of the $32 trillion market for CSR. In light of the
undeniable empirical evidence that such a market exists and considering the
increasing efforts of corporations to court shareholders and consumers with
socially responsible preferences,' 57 failing to engage in a minimal effort at
identifying those interests is a version of managers simply sticking their heads
in the sand. The market for morality will most certainly collapse unless
corporate managers adequately take into account market preferences for the
collection, reporting, and dissemination of truthful data regarding socially
responsible business practices.158 Ignoring the impending collapse by
knowingly embracing a false assumption that all shareholders remain primarily
interested in short-term wealth maximization is just as irrational as a child
simply covering her eyes to avoid impending harm. As currently interpreted, the
gross negligence exception to the business judgment rule has the retrograde
effect of incentivizing corporate managers to act like irrational children and
simply blithely blind themselves to the impending collapse of the market for
CSR.
But with respect to the duty of care, what does that minimal effort at
identifying shareholders and stakeholder preferences entail and how would
courts actually enforce the standard? Quite frankly, a duty of care under a new
154 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
155 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 159-61.
156 Although in the first article in the series, I maintained that "[w]ith respect to
stakeholder interests, then, it is not necessary to justify their direct participation in the
discursive project involving corporate decisionmaking if some shareholders possess
preferences for taking those stakeholder interests into account," see Siebecker, supra note
12, at 228, my approach has evolved in light of the significant political implications of
Citizens United and corporate dominance of public discourse. Properly construed, a
discourse theory of the firm would require directors to take into account non-shareholder
interests directly in order to provide the best case for economic efficiency and political
legitimacy.
157 See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
I58 See supra Part III.B.
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discourse theory of the firm would not differ significantly from the current duty
already in place. It would remain a process-based standard designed to ensure
minimal integrity in the decisions managers render.159 If attending to market
preferences for CSR produces mutual gains-where the corporate cost of
comporting with market preferences for certain CSR practices remains less than
the premium CSR consumers and investors are willing to pay in increased stock
and product price-then it seems wholly irrational and grossly negligent not to
assess in some minimal way the existence of such win-win bargains. So if a
disgruntled shareholder brought a claim alleging a business decision violated
the duty of care for not taking into account the CSR preferences of certain
shareholders, the board could completely insulate itself from liability simply by
demonstrating that it had in place some rational mechanism for identifying,
collecting, and interpreting those interests. The point of an effort at
identification that involves some dialogue with corporate constituencies does
not require managers to heed every shareholder or stakeholder concern. What
seems grossly negligent and wholly irrational, however, is to ignore out of hand
shareholder and stakeholder preferences that could provide greater welfare for
all parties involved.160
Such a minimal process-based standard immediately invites criticism as
insufficient to produce robust dialogue that the tenets of discourse theory
require. Although certainly not a hollow claim, the criticism fails to take into
account how the rule changes incentives and behaviors over time. 161 Currently,
directors and corporate managers can simply ignore to a great extent
shareholder and stakeholder concerns with virtual impunity. But they do so at
the expense-literally--of significant potential economic gains of the
corporation. The new minimal procedural rule starts the ball rolling down the
hill as corporations realize that win-win gains exist through participating
sincerely in the market for morality.162 But if this is so ineluctably true in the
long run that directors will realize the current folly of their ways in permitting
corporate obfuscation of CSR communications, why do they even need a legal
rule to coax them? Shouldn't logic simply serve as the guide to locate win-win
exchanges? Were that true, there would be no need for the business judgment
rule. But despite what some law and economics scholars hold dear, the market
159 See Siebecker, supra note 150, at 826-27.
160For a taxonomy of corporate fiduciary duties and an explication of the gross
negligence exception to the business judgment rule, see Julian Velasco, How Many
Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1237-39 (2010).
161 See Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDozo L. REv. 491, 499-500
(2012) (describing interpretations of fiduciary duties as dynamic rather than static to account
for evolving value, practices, and contexts).
162 See Julian Velasco, The Role ofAspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 519, 524-29 (2012) (describing the advantages and pitfalls of ambiguity in
corporate fiduciary duties that provide more aspirational goals than concrete requirements
for action).
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does not in fact function perfectly.163 Transaction costs, imperfect information,
and unequal bargaining power pervade corporate life.164 A slightly enhanced
procedural standard for engaging shareholders will push corporate
constituencies into a collective dialogue that in the long run should produce
mutually beneficial outcomes.
With respect to the duty of loyalty, a discourse theory of the firm would
require greater transparency and disclosure of corporate information, especially
data regarding corporate political activities. 165 The heightened control
corporations exercise in myriad aspects of economic, social, and political life
already begs for greater transparency regarding corporate practices. As Citizens
United affords corporations unprecedented new avenues for dominating the
political agenda, the need for transparency in corporate political activity
achieves a piercing pitch.166 The special concern animating that disclosure is the
heightened potential for corporate managers to shirk their fiduciary
responsibilities and use the corporation's treasury to advance their own political
preferences.1 67 The potential for corporations to secretly dominate political
agendas and outcomes in a manner inconsistent with shareholder preferences
undoubtedly contributed to the recent spike of shareholder proposals regarding
corporate political transparency.168 Without disclosure of the political activities
of corporations, shareholders cannot effectively hold managers accountable for
their actions, participate effectively in the political positions corporations take,
163 See Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and
Economics, 86 TUL. L. REV. 135, 148 (2011) ("Recent history has highlighted the
problematic assumption that factor markets operated with perfect efficiency, but market
failures in factor markets should come as no surprise in general.").
164Id. at 145-51.
165 See Amir N. Licht, State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest
and Board Composition, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 597, 607 (2012) ("In a nutshell,
the common law typically responds to agency (power) situations by imposing a duty of
loyalty on agents, the core of which comprises a proscription on acting when in a conflict of
interests and a duty of full disclosure of material information. Although these are the
characteristic features of trust relations, in their very essence, these legal doctrines reflect
suspicion and anything but blind trust; trust hinges on accountability and transparency."
(footnote omitted)); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law's Lessons for
Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2011) (discussing the connection
between a duty of loyalty, candor, and deliberative democracy). For a general discussion of
the connection between the duty of loyalty, transparency, and candor, see Thomas Lee
Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors-Emphasizing
Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1861-63 (2012).
166See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent
Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 691-713 (2012) (arguing for disclosure of the corporate
political activities following Citizens United).
167 See William Alan Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative
Claims of Corporate Waste To Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13
NEv. L.J. 134, 137 (2012).
168 Che Odom, Chair Autonomy, Political Spending Most Popular 2013 Proxy Season
Proposals, 16 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 133-34 (Dec. 2, 2013).
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or know whether purchasing a corporation's stock or product at a particular
price satisfies their preferences.169
Manifesting the disclosure of political corporate activity via common law
duty of loyalty could attach to the duty to monitor corporate malfeasance
through Stone v. Ritter 70 and its predecessor In re Caremark.171 Both cases
involved instances in which corporations allegedly failed to put in place
information gathering and reporting systems that would enable the board to
monitor effectively the presence of criminal or other nefarious activity within
the corporation. 172 Although the source of the duty as articulated in Caremark
stemmed from the duty of care, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone stated
that the duty to monitor more sensibly attaches to a duty of loyalty.173
Regardless of the switch in the jurisprudential foundation for the duty, the
ultimate standard articulated in Stone echoed the existing requirement that a
corporation must not "utterly fail[] to implement any reporting or information
system or controls" to detect corporate wrongdoing. 174 Applied in the context of
a discourse theory of the firm, to ensure managers were not using the
corporation to serve their own political ends at the expense of the corporation
would require some minimal information gathering and reporting system
regarding the political activities of the corporation and the connection of
political positions to the basic business goals of the corporation.175 An obvious
basic component of any minimally adequate system would involve transparent
collection and disclosure of political activities of the corporation.176 Although it
remains open how to assess if corporate political activities advance the
economic interests of the corporation, without that basic first step of disclosure,
any meaningful discourse about the political positions the corporation should
adopt simply cannot take place. Though not ensuring full and fair discourse, the
disclosure of political data through the duty of loyalty represents a necessary
but not wholly sufficient condition to embrace a new discourse theory of the
firm.
B. Legislative
Although slightly tweaking existing common law principles represents a
minimally intrusive yet highly effective way to get the discourse ball rolling,
169 See Nelson, supra note 167, at 137-38.
170 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
171In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
172 See Velasco, supra note 160, at 1232-37. For an extensive discussion of the evolving
duty of oversight provided by Stone and Caremark, see id. at 1260-68.
173 Id. at 1234.
174 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
175 See Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate
Governance Law, 28 J.L. & POL. 51, 77-78 (2012).
176 Id. at 78-79 (describing information failures that prevent shareholders from
monitoring director abuses of corporate political spending).
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legislative initiatives provide another important and complementary component
of corporate discourse theory. Positing that statutes mandate taking into account
stakeholder interests or disclosing political activities should not seem striking in
the least. On the domestic front, a great number of states already permit through
non-shareholder constituency statutes the ability of directors and officers to take
into account stakeholder interests that can involve employees, consumers,
citizens of the community the corporation inhabits, and economies of the state,
nation, and world.177 A growing number of states also permit the formation of
"benefit corporations" that mandate directors to consider stakeholder interests
as part of the corporate charter.178 Currently twenty states have passed
legislation permitting benefit corporations and another eighteen states continue
to consider adopting the new business form.179 Taking those charges seriously
would require engaging in some sort of discourse with the stakeholders
considered. Ensuring those instances of communicative action produce adequate
discourse could require articulation of concrete minimal steps for engagement
or simply transparent public disclosure of the methods for ensuring discourse
that the market could reward or punish.
Beyond state law, federal securities laws could accomplish a similar goal.
Passed in the wake of a variety of massive corporate scandals, Sarbanes-
Oxley 80 and the Dodd-Frank Actl81 already mandate additional disclosure of
information relevant to ensure the integrity of the corporation and the capital
markets. For instance, Dodd-Frank requires most public companies to disclose
details of executive compensation 82 and provide an opportunity for a non-
binding shareholder vote on the pay schemes.183 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires public corporations to adopt and report a code of ethics or to announce
why the corporation does not possess such a code.184 Although some question
the efficacy of the code of ethics disclosure requirement, the provision causes
public corporations to adopt a more stakeholder-centric mode of conducting
business and engaging society. 85 Within a discourse theory framework, that
177 See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 523, 526 (2011) (stating that as of 2003, forty-one states had enacted "constituency
statutes" that authorized management to take into consideration a range of non-shareholder
interests).
178 See Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism To
Consider the Creation ofSocial Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 743,759-61 (2010).
179Legislation, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014).180 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
181 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 951-956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1906 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j-3, 78j-4, 781, 78n-1 (2012)).
182 Id. §§ 953, 955-956.
183 Id. § 951.
18415 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2012).
185See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1781, 1790 (2007) (stating that a
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existing mandate could be expanded to include a statement regarding the
corporation's position regarding shareholder and stakeholder engagement.
Without requiring any particular dialogue, it would force the issue to the
forefront of the corporate agenda. Again, although not ensuring the full and fair
discourse idealized under a discourse theory of the firm, a mandate requiring
public disclosure of a policy regarding stakeholder engagement as part of a code
of ethics would create an incentive for corporations to begin realizing the
potential for win-win gains through more robust and inclusive dialogue.
In the international arena, statutory efforts to force a more robust dialogue
with shareholders and stakeholders seem increasingly common. For instance,
Section 172 of the Companies Act in the United Kingdom requires taking
stakeholder interests into account in making business decisions.186 Other
countries, such as Peru, require a much more detailed dialogue between
corporations and stakeholders to justify certain corporate actions.187 Some
might suggest that legislating the mechanics of full and fair discourse would
produce excessive corporate costs and losses that ultimately disadvantage the
constituencies whose viewpoints are considered. The point of exploring
legislative initiatives is not to settle on a precise set of rules for discourse, but to
underscore that legislation can provide incentives for corporations to engage
groups that existing laws might allow them to ignore. And to the extent ignoring
those market preferences creates the potential for economic loss, a set of rules
that promote the need to search (arguably in a cost effective fashion) for mutual
gains hardly seems detrimental.
C. Administrative
Even without additional legislative action, administrative agencies could at
least require greater transparency, disclosure, and participation on a host of
matters that would provide a stronger platform upon which to build a discourse
theory of the firm. The SEC already requires disclosure regarding the effects of
business practices on environmental issues and climate change.188 Following
Citizens United, a groundswell of support (and pressure) from shareholders and
review of studies on codes of ethics adopted after Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrated that half
were effective in reducing unethical behavior and half did not find a statistically significant
effect). But see Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI.
L. REv. 923, 932 (2010) (book review) ("Evolving governance norms and regulations such
as Sarbanes-Oxley both address financial transparency and prescribe specific requirements
for the board generally, and the audit committee in particular, designed to increase
information flow and reduce capture of the independent directors. These reforms appear
consistent with Macey's conception of effective governance." (footnote omitted)).186 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
187 See Kevin O'Callaghan & Luis Carlos Rodrigo Prado, Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent: International Origins and Its Application in Canada and Peru, 58 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-32 to 18-38 (2012) (discussing the level of community engagement
and discourse to garner the necessary informed consent for certain mining projects).
188 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2012).
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other interest groups exists for new disclosure regulations targeting corporate
political donations and activities. 189 Outside the SEC, other agencies participate
in securing robust dialogue between corporations and various non-shareholder
constituencies. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (and similar
state environmental agencies) require detailed environmental impact statements
that require dialogue with communities prior to approving various corporate
projects. 190
Though arguably not sufficient to produce the kind of full and fair discourse
that a new discourse theory of the firm envisions, administrative actions can
work in conjunction with common law and legislative changes to form a new
corporate law regime that assesses the legitimacy of corporate decisions and
actions based on robust discourse. Such a doctrinal shift would not only produce
greater effectiveness within the organizational structure of the corporation but
an enhanced attentiveness to real market preferences that mark opportunities for
wealth creation.
D. Non- Governmental
Non-governmental institutions can play significant roles in effecting a new
discourse theory for corporate organization. Perhaps most obviously, securities
exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, establish
their own rules regarding disclosure of corporate data.191 As part of the bargain
to gain access to the capital markets, the exchanges could require disclosure of
information relevant to CSR-focused consumers and investors, including
corporate political activity.192 In addition, various professional institutions or
organizations could incentivize corporations to engage in greater discourse with
shareholders and stakeholders. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) could be altered to include disclosure of political contributions and
activities. 193 Various international organizations, such as the United Nations 94
18 9 Elizabeth Dwoskin, SEC May Force Disclosure of Political Contributions,
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-16/sec-may-
force-disclosure-of-political-contributions (describing the public pressure animating the
SEC's consideration of a new disclosure rule for political contributions); Odom, supra note
168.
190 See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, NEPA's Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-
carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REv. 511, 545-46 (2013) (discussing the nature of
climate change disclosures required in the EPA environmental impact statement regarding
the TransCanada proposed Keystone XL pipeline).
191 Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That
Should Be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1184-94 (2005).
192 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later,
64 S.C. L. REv. 1, 19 (2012) (describing the disclosure requirements on securities
exchanges).
193 Although plausible, many attribute recent corporate scandals to the failure of the
accounting industry to engage in sufficient self-regulation to ensure transparency in the
capital markets. See Fisch, supra note 185, at 932 n.50.
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and the European Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme,195 already
require much greater political disclosures and public engagement of stakeholder
interests. Moreover, rating agencies that grade debt securities could require the
same political disclosures in order to render more accurate assessments of
companies in light of their political commitments (granting that political
commitments remain connected to financial performance).196
In the end, a host of common law, statutory, administrative, and non-
governmental standards could be put in place to foster greater dialogue among
corporate managers, shareholders, and stakeholders consistent with a new
discourse theory of the firm. Although significant, the complementary standards
remain rather minor changes in existing regulatory structures and, as a result,
should not cause much consternation or paroxysm as unduly burdensome
measures. How corporations might satisfy those new standards for discourse
and disclosure represents the next step in fleshing out a new discourse theory of
the firm.
V. MODES OF EFFECTIVE DISCOURSE
Although the preceding discussion regarding potential standards for
corporate communication aimed at establishing rules and incentives that
promote the basic tenets of discourse theory in the corporate context, some
guidance needs to be provided regarding how corporations might satisfy those
standards. Of course, some standards remain fairly easy to discern and apply.
For instance, a statutory mandate requiring disclosure of corporate political
contributions does not require great elaboration. In contrast, a safe harbor for
satisfying a common law duty involving minimally sufficient processes for
shareholder engagement floats in murkier waters. What constitutes a minimally
sufficient reporting system to comport with a duty of loyalty? How does a
corporation separate nettlesome shareholders from those that present
opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges that promote wealth creation?
The following discussion does not describe the full panoply of options for
implementing a discourse theory of the firm. And again, the project remains
wholly pragmatic rather than idealized. Dialogue among managers,
194 United Nations, Global Compact Office, Corporate Sustainability in the World
Economy (Jan. 2014), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/8. 1 /GC brochure
_FINAL.pdf (describing how signatories agree to disclosure in their annual reports the
means by which corporations implement the ten principles of the Compact).
195 See Commission Regulation 1221/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 342) 1, 2 (EC) ("Organisations
should produce and make publicly available periodic environmental statements providing the
public and other interested parties with information on their compliance with applicable
legal requirements relating to the environment and their environmental performance.").
196 See Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 1559, 1606-07 (2008) (suggesting that rating agencies play an important role along
with government regulators and other CSR organizations to promote more environmentally
responsible business practices).
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shareholders, and other stakeholders that fully satisfies the tenets of discourse
theory does not represent the goal, for perfection remains outside law's grasp in
any context. Instead, the project now is to introduce a few mechanisms for
securing a more robust dialogue among managers, shareholders, and other
corporate stakeholders that reflect the diverse approaches to detailed
organizational change centered on enhanced discourse. What links each is an
attention to the social science of discourse that involves consideration of
empirical evidence and theory. The modes of discourse cover a range of
disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and
organizational theory. Given the quickly burgeoning research on shareholder
and stakeholder discourse, providing a comprehensive review of all possible
approaches to robust and effective discourse remains implausible. And leaving
somewhat ambiguous what methods satisfy the standards for minimally
sufficient discourse could actually provide an incentive for continual
prophylactic refinement in the face of uncertainty. Nonetheless, surveying a few
mechanisms for effective discourse mechanisms provides starting points for
solving the substantial problems infecting current corporate law doctrine.
A. Strategic CSR
Strategic CSR arguably provides the most alluring and effective mode of
discourse by securing mutually beneficial gains among corporate managers,
shareholders, and other stakeholders.197 In simple terms, strategic CSR attempts
to cultivate stakeholder communication that can produce economic gain to the
corporation and avoid nettlesome distraction or capture by especially vested and
vocal interest groups. The approach rests on the recognition of "[a]n emerging
stakeholder management trade-off ... definable as the call for a comprehensive
identification of all stakeholders' expectations vs. the scarcity of resources in
order to address all the identified stakeholder issues." 98 In light of the
limitation on management resources to address all potential stakeholder or
shareholder interests, business and society can succeed together only if
corporate policies focus on opportunities for value creation rather than wallow
in social conflict.199
In order for companies and society to secure mutual gains, strategic CSR
attempts to identify through increasingly targeted discourse the specific social
concerns that provide competitive advantages to business while producing
19 7 See Giacomo Boesso & Giovanna Michelon, The Effects of Stakeholder
Prioritization on Corporate Financial Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 27 INT'L J.
MANAGEMENT 470,474 (2010).
198 Id. at 471; see also Francisco J. Callado-Mufioz & Natalia Utrero-Gonzdlez, Does It
Pay To Be Socially Responsible? Evidence from Spain's Retail Banking Sector, 17 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 755, 762-77 (2011) (using an empirical study to demonstrate that corporations must
engage in dialogue to discern which CSR concerns provide financial gains and those that
simply distract).
199 Boesso & Michelon, supra note 197, at 471.
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greater satisfaction to stakeholder groups.200 Through discursive engagement
with various stakeholder groups, corporations can divide stakeholder interests
into concerns affecting long-term corporate sustainability (e.g., poor
environmental or economic conditions), current business operations (e.g.,
implementing better pollution mitigation devices to avoid consumer flight), and
social dimensions of competitive growth (e.g., investment in local education
and transportation to expand the customer base). 201 Only when a symbiotic
relationship exists between fulfilling stakeholder interests and enhancing
corporate competitiveness does strategic CSR develop.202 In essence, strategic
CSR produces a classic win-win bargain.
Securing mutual gains often depends on revamping internal organizational
practices to more accurately identify relevant stakeholders, their interests, and
the potential opportunities for manager-stakeholder cooperation.203 For
example, Abe Zakhem suggests implementing a phased approach that utilizes
"rational," "process," and "transactional" analyses to obtain targeted
stakeholder engagement.204 The rational phase broadly maps the various
stakeholder groups and their interests, and the process stage examines the best
means for engaging those groups based on discourse theory principles,
including fairness and openness. 205 Finally, the transaction stage identifies
opportunities for win-win trades, so that both managers and stakeholders gain
not only in terms of satisfaction with the deliberative process but regarding the
outcome of the negotiation itself.206
Of course, the viability of strategic CSR remains tethered to the existence of
a business case for socially responsible business behavior. But in the sense
considered here, strategic CSR goes beyond an assessment of whether investors
and consumers will pay a premium in stock or product price for a company that
engages in socially responsible practices. Taking a more holistic and longer-
term approach, strategic CSR attempts through targeted stakeholder engagement
to determine the various ways in which engaging in CSR might produce a
competitive advantage for the company. Only with a nuanced engagement of
20 0 Id. ("The interdependence of business and society is thus proposed as strategic
guidelines in order to incorporate CSR in the core business choices and to provide practical
guidance to corporate leaders in terms of how to anchor the interrelationships between a
corporation and society in strategic planning."); see also Isaiah Yeshayahu Marom, Toward
a Unified Theory of the CSP-CFP Link, 67 J. Bus. ETHICs 191, 197 (2006) ("The Unified
Theory, which draws on the parallels between the CSR and business domains, exhibits a
balance between financial rewards from satisfied stakeholders and costs incurred in
producing social outputs.").
201 Boesso & Michelon, supra note 197, at 473-74.
202Id. at 474.2 03 See Michael R. Siebecker, Communicative Action and the Corporation, I INT'L J.
Bus. & MGMT. STuD. 561, 564 (2012).
204Abe Zakhem, Stakeholder Management Capability: A Discourse-Theoretical
Approach, 79 J. Bus. ETHICs 395, 401-04 (2008).
205 Id
206jd.
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various stakeholder interests and mechanisms for assessing how attending to
those interests might affect financial performance over time can managers
effectively sift through the cacophony of corporate voices that clamor for
managerial attention.
B. Stakeholder Solicitation
Closely connected to strategic CSR, another avenue for enhanced discourse
focuses on means to gather and interpret investor and consumer preferences
regarding corporate governance and other CSR practices. From a social science
standpoint, the approach intends to understand the dynamic ways in which the
perceptions and preferences of consumers, investors, and stakeholders change
based on continual corporate communications. 207 That effort facilitates the
development of a more sophisticated set of processes to disseminate and collect
information that corporate constituencies find important.208 Some suggest using
targeted discourse to solicit and shape investor preferences that can produce a
positive framework for corporate growth and to discourage discourse that
panders to special interests unconnected with overall economic health of the
firm.209 Even with respect to ostensibly nettlesome activists, corporate
managers "should diagnose the likelihood of attracting activist investors by
identifying where activists may see hidden value to be extracted, and plan the
course ahead." 210
The solicitation of shareholder and stakeholder preferences plays an
important mitigating function in sustaining the health of the corporation when
crises arise. As the American Bar Association (ABA) reported in a recent study,
when corporations put in place discourse mechanisms to take seriously the
viewpoints of consumers and investors on a variety of issues regarding
corporate practices and governance, the corporation gains stability and earns
trust from groups that could otherwise adopt a continually combative tone.211
According to the ABA report, investors should possess a greater role in the
process of selecting directors, gain enhanced access to corporate information
that ensures effective shareholder monitoring, and participate more fully in
discussions regarding business strategies. 212 Those mechanisms for enhanced
207 See, e.g., Rodrigo Lozano, Addressing Stakeholders and Better Contributing to
Sustainability Through Game Theory, 43 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 45, 45 (2011).208 Id
209 See Rock, supra note 20, at 892-902 (discussing strategies through which "a firm
can transform investors into shareholders of the desirable type. The core intuition is Winston
Churchill's: 'We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us."').
2 10 Tina Chi, Shareholder Activism: Boards Urged To Prep Response Teams in Light of
Growing Shareholder Activism, CORP. L. & AccOUNTABILITY REP. (Apr. 24, 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
211 Tina Chi, Corporate Laws: ABA Business Law Section Urges Boards To Enhance
Communications with Shareholders, CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (Jan. 29, 2010)
(discussing the ABA report).
212Id
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discourse generate a reserve of good will that helps the corporation thrive even
when crises erupt.213
Moreover, in her December 2013 speech at the Transatlantic Corporate
Governance Dialogue, SEC Chair Mary Jo White touted the importance of
effective managerial engagement of shareholders:
Engagement with shareholders should mean more than just mailing out the
annual proxy statement and conducting the annual meeting. It should mean
proactive outreach, and clear, direct, and honest communications about how
and why decisions are being made. Companies must work to inform their
shareholders, to convey information about their governance policies and
practices and to convince shareholders to vote, on the merits, for the
company's nominees for director and for management's proposals. And the
board of directors is-or ought to be-a central player in shareholder
engagement. 214
Noting that corporations now enter a "new era" of shareholder activism, she
urged directors and corporate managers to find new ways to engage
shareholders and the other stakeholders corporate policies affect.215
Other modes for effective stakeholder solicitation do not involve extensive
managerial direction. Much study has been dedicated to promoting and
monitoring "multiple-issue arenas" in which stakeholders of all stripes
communicate in various dynamic contexts regarding corporate policies outside
the corporation's control. 216 Those arenas remain quite protean and take place
in any traditional or virtual media where public debates about corporate
practices occur.217 Although corporations can simply monitor the discourse,
active participation in the dialogue provides a better chance that the corporation
can attend to growing stakeholder concerns in a manner that produces positive
results for all participants. 218 In essence, through dynamic engagement in a
variety of communicative settings, corporations can stay ahead of the curve in
managing market preferences. 219 Moving away from unidirectional
communication from the corporation to the public, multiple-issue arenas entail
a multidimensional perspective where dialogue, collaboration, and negotiation
with multiple stakeholders occur simultaneously, while maintaining a zone of
balance, an equilibrium that satisfies mutual interests. The role of PR [public
relations] is thus to keep the virtues of "public discourse," as the debate could
213 Id.
2 14 See White, supra note 1.2 15 1d
2 16 See Vilma Luoma-aho & Marita Vos, Towards a More Dynamic Stakeholder Model:
Acknowledging Multiple Issue Arenas, 15 CORP. COMM. INT'L J. 315, 316-25 (2010)
(discussing the growing literature around multiple-issue arenas in the corporate context).
217Id. at 324.
218Id at 316-17, 322-23.
219Id
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be high jacked by extreme stakeholders, thereby hindering problem solving
and collaboration by others.220
As new media develops within which stakeholders communicate, effectively
attending to multiple issue arenas requires a multifaceted approach that involves
both participation and monitoring to gain a competitive advantage.221
Assessing stakeholder salience constitutes an essential component to each
of these solicitation strategies. Heeding every expressed viewpoint can cause
costly distraction without producing gains for any party.222 Based on social
psychology studies, some organizational theorists emphasize the need to assess
the degree to which different stakeholder groups can reward and punish
companies regarding their CSR performance. 223 Groups that remain sufficiently
organized, funded, embedded, and engaged over time provide the clearest
examples of stakeholder interest groups whose views can affect financial
performance. 224 Thus, even though stakeholder engagement across multiple
fronts through dynamic modes of discourse can produce mutual gains, the
discourse should not occur haphazardly. 225 Instead, effective modes of
discourse should rely on empirical evidence obtained through organizational
and social science investigations.
C. Intermediary Involvement
To assist corporations and shareholders in effective discourse, intermediary
organizations can play an important role in filtering and processing stakeholder
views. Perhaps based on a concern that shareholders and other stakeholders
might lack the competence to sift through and interpret effectively the vast
amounts of information necessary to make sound choices regarding corporate
policy, some suggest that non-profit or quasi-governmental organizations with
particularized interests could serve as effective expert liaisons between
stakeholders and corporate managers. 226 Some profit-based entities, such as
MSCI, provide expert analytical services both to corporations and investors
220Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
221Id. at 324.
22 2 See John Peloza & Lisa Papania, The Missing Link Between Corporate Social
Responsibility and Financial Performance: Stakeholder Salience and Identification, 11
CORP. REPUTATION REV. 169, 170 (2008).
2 23 See generally id. (surveying the social psychology literature in an attempt to discern
when heeding stakeholder concerns leads to enhanced financial performance).
224Id at 176-77.
2 25 See Aditi Bagchi, Who Should Talk? What Counts as Employee Voice and Who
Stands To Gain, 94 MARQ. L. REv. 869, 878-85 (2011) (discussing strategies for effectively
taking into account salient employee concerns).
2 26 See, e.g., Laura Albareda, Mapping the Novel Arrangements Adopted To Build the
Corporate Responsibility Institutional Setting: A Contested Dynamic Interplay, 40 J. CORP.
CITIZENSHIP 75 (2010).
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regarding CSR matters. 227 Using sophisticated information collection and
monitoring techniques, MSCI helps investors make reasoned choices about
company CSR practices in light of the existing regulatory regime that does not
provide sufficient transparency or data intelligible to most CSR consumers and
investors.228 Non-profit entities play a similar role as well. For instance,
NomoGaia Global Human Rights employs its own Human Rights Impact
Assessment that the non-profit organization uses to assess various companies'
human rights practices. 229 The reports are disseminated to the companies and
made publicly available to foster discourse among the company and stakeholder
groups to produce mutually beneficial changes in corporate practices regarding
human rights issues. 230
Beyond developing new metrics for collecting, filtering, and disseminating
data relevant to stakeholders and investors, strategic partnerships between
corporations and various interest groups can facilitate a mutually beneficial
discourse. 231 For instance, cross-sector social partnerships (CSSP) represent
cooperative efforts between firms and non-profit organizations that involve
"integrated collaboration between firms with clear core competencies who are
willing participants in a mutual exchange of value to invest in a long-term
commitment to positive global change." 232 CSSPs that often involve joint
ventures between business and stakeholder groups "can be an efficient way for
businesses to evidence corporate values and social responsibility while pairing
up with organizations that have the expertise to implement socially
entrepreneurial programs. It also allows participating corporations access to
markets that have previously untapped potential."233
Thus, to the extent corporations and shareholders lack the resources and
competence to engage in direct discourse, intermediary organizations can play
227 See MSCI, MSCI ESG RESEARCH 1 (2012), available at http://www.msci.com/resour
ces/factsheets/MSCIESG Research.pdf ("MSCI ESG Research provides in-depth research,
ratings and analysis of the environmental, social and governance-related business practices
of thousands of companies worldwide. Our products and services are used by institutional
investors to integrate ESG factors into their investment processes. Our insights can help
investors to uncover risks and opportunities that conventional investment research might not
detect.").
2 28 Id.229NOMOGAIA, http://www.nomogaia.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). As described on
NomoGaia's website, the organization is "a nonprofit research and policy organization
dedicated to clarifying the corporate role in human rights protection and facilitating
corporate responsibility for the communities impacted by capital projects." Id.
230 For an example of NomoGaia's Human Rights Impact Assessment involving Dole,
see NOMOGAIA, DOLE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2010), available at http://nomo
gaia.org/2010/12/dole-fresh-fruit-hria-sample/ (download the zip file; then open 1_Costa_
Rica DoleFresh FreshFruitHRIA.pdf).
231 See William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate
Profits and Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 141, 219-51 (2012)
(using game theory concepts to assess the effectiveness of corporation-NGO partnerships).
232 Cotten & Lasprogata, supra note 48, at 10.
233 Id. at 21.
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an essential diagnostic and facilitating function. Those intermediary entities,
whether for profit or otherwise, serve as discourse therapists that strive to build
a healthier relationship among all the parties affected by corporate policies and
practices.
D. Managerial Remodeling
Although striving toward the same goal of promoting mutually beneficial
gains for corporations and stakeholders, another strategy involves retooling
internal decision-making structures to make better sense of the discourse
already taking place. For example, one scholar suggests that corporate managers
should employ formal game theory to help sift through the hodgepodge of
stakeholder concerns. 234 Attention to formal organizational or political theory
helps avoid showering excessive attention on certain shareholder groups that
might not provide synergistic benefits to the corporation. 235
Moving from a theoretical to a practical change, implementing new
communicative technologies remains essential to facilitate transparency and
accountability in a quickly evolving world.236 One such project, dubbed
"Accountability 2.0," rests on adopting multi-staged engagement across various
communication platforms.237 Based on empirical evidence culled from
educational studies, the technologically enhanced discourse attempts to produce
a "'blended engagement'-that is, a mix of Web-based and direct human
interaction-to leverage the benefits of virtual environments with those of face-
to-face contacts." 238 The sites of the discourse include public communication,
customer relations management, advertising, marketing and brand maintenance,
risk management, problem solving, and crisis mitigation all with a goal towards
"real time, ongoing, interactive reporting, disclosure and dialogue around
accountability." 239 Again, the key criterion with respect to each of these sites of
discourse is transparency.240 Citing some corporations, such as Timberland, as
potential models for others to follow, the study notes that the future of robust
accountability depends on interactive communication platforms that adapt to the
ways in which actual consumers, investors, and stakeholders communicate with
each other and corporations.
Although the preceding discussion of different modes of effective discourse
does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of the vast social science
literature surrounding stakeholder engagement, the methods examined provide
234 See Lozano, supra note 207; see also Bradford, supra note 231, at 220-51
(employing a game theory analysis of stakeholder partnerships).
235 See Siebecker, supra note 203, at 564.
236 Bill Baue & Marcy Muminghan, The Accountability Web: Weaving Corporate
Accountability and Interactive Technology, 41 J. CORP. CITIzENsHIP 27, 36 (2011).
237 Id.
2 3 8 Id
239Id. at 37.
240 Id. at 28.
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examples of how corporations might satisfy some of the new standards for
implementing a new discourse theory of the firm. Again, the goal is not to attain
perfection regarding the goals of discourse theory. The project remains much
more pragmatic, with an eye towards making improvements that corporations,
shareholders, and stakeholders would find workable. But falling short of
realizing the ideal does not signal surrender. Instead, a new legal construct of
the firm centered on discourse provides actual benefits precisely because it can
be achieved through incremental changes in legal standards and business
practices. Adopting a new discourse theory of the firm does not involve a
charge to the barricades. Instead, discourse theory simply represents a more
nuanced way of analyzing corporate law doctrine in a manner that pays greater
descriptive fidelity to the actual ways in which corporations, shareholders, and
other stakeholders interact in modem society. And with that greater descriptive
clarity comes a normatively superior framework for addressing new corporate
law problems that will arise as social institutions continue to evolve.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW DISCOURSE THEORY OF THE FIRM
A new discourse theory of the firm will help solve the problems plaguing
current corporate law doctrine identified at the outset of this Article. In
particular, implementing new rules and incentives to promote robust discourse
will provide significant insights regarding the role shareholders and other
stakeholders should play in corporate governance, will help sustain the $32
trillion market for CSR,24 1 and will restore a sense of legitimacy to the political
processes that corporations increasingly dominate. Examining how a new
discourse theory of the firm promotes corporate efficiency and political
legitimacy should make the new corporate construct an easy sell. For if both are
obtained, discourse theory provides mutual gains for businesses, the
constituencies that corporations affect, and the polity at whose sufferance
corporations exist.
A. Efficiency
Economic efficiency represents a fundamental advantage of a new
discourse theory of the firm over existing corporate law doctrine. At first blush,
this might seem odd considering the prevailing theory of the corporation that
remains firmly predicated on shareholder wealth maximization. 242 But a theory
of corporate organization based on continual discourse among corporate
managers, consumers, investors, and other stakeholders will necessarily produce
241 PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 6, at 3.
242 See Barbara Fried, Is as Ought: The Case of Contracts, 92 VA. L. REv. 1375, 1386-
89 (2006) (discussing the tension between normative theories and efficiency); Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1698 (1996)
(positing the likely inefficiency in normative theory in regulating behavior).
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a Pareto improvement over a stilted view of the corporation rooted in false
assumptions about human rationality. 243
But why would discourse theory necessarily promote efficiency if not
centered on wealth maximization? A common fallacy in law and economics
discourse provides the answer. Rather than focusing simply on wealth
maximization, efficiency targets satisfaction of actual preferences, even those
that do not carry a clear price tag.244 As the burgeoning market for CSR
demonstrates, consumers and investors possess interests regarding a variety of
social, political, ethical, and environmental matters that do not reflect a blind
dedication to short-term wealth maximization. 245 And as those preferences
change, the role that the corporation plays in society evolves as well.
Thus, efficient rules for corporate organization should reflect what
corporate managers, shareholders, consumers, and other stakeholders would
hypothetically negotiate in a world of perfect information and without the
burdens of any transaction costs in bargaining. 246 As the preferences of any
parties change, the outcome of that hypothetical bargain would necessarily
change. By definition, however, a static set of standards premised upon short-
term wealth maximization cannot accommodate changing preferences. If
preferences regarding the rules governing corporate behavior changed (perhaps
regarding the role shareholders should play in corporate governance; the
collection and dissemination of CSR data; or transparent disclosure of corporate
political activities), strict adherence to static standards would undermine
efficiency.247 Instead of relying on a highly stylized and stilted view of the
human condition as singularly focused on selfish wealth maximization,
discourse theory adopts a much more behavioral economic approach.248 A new
243 "Pareto Efficiency" represents a particular concept of efficiency articulated by
Vilfredo Pareto. See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL EcoNOMY (Ann S.
Schweir & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schweir trans., 1971) (1906). According to Pareto,
an efficient allocation of resources exists when no person could be made better off without
making another individual worse off. Id. For a discussion of competing theories of
efficiency, see Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice:
The Integration ofFairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249, 267 n.80 (1998).
244See Williams, supra note 105, at 1657 (criticizing the "teaching of 'primitive' law
and economics, which has taken the neoclassical economist's stylized picture of the person,
homo economicus, a self-interested utility maximizer, and has assumed that this two-
dimensional person occupies the real world, subjecting every aspect of life to a cost-benefit
analysis, including decisions about law compliance").245 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 162.246 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087, 1152-54 (1996); Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 1197, 1201-03 (1999).
247 See Siebecker, supra note 47, at 167.
248 For a description of the distinction between a neoclassical approach to human
rationality and a behavioral economic sensitivity, see Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T
Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1667
(2003) ("The essential inaccuracy of the rational man model has minimized the capacity of
2014] 149
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
discourse theory of the firm requires engaging actual investors, consumers, and
other stakeholders as they exist. By taking into account the interests of real,
rather than pretend, parties to the negotiation, discourse theory enhances the
likelihood of an efficient outcome regarding the rules governing corporate
behavior.249
And even with respect to wealth maximization, a discourse theory of the
firm provides incentives for corporations to seek competitive advantages that
promote economic gains.250 Although some disparage in blanket fashion any
input by shareholders in corporate governance, a growing body of evidence
suggests that proper consideration of various shareholder, consumer, and
stakeholder concerns can produce significant opportunities for wealth
creation. 251 Some adhere to overly simplistic solutions, such as shareholders
selling their shares whenever dissatisfied with company practices. As Roger
Lowenstein explains, however:
To function well, organizations need the threat of exit, otherwise voice is
powerless. But for the manifold decisions that do not rise to a level of all-out
confrontation, "voice" is often more effective. A management aware of a real
threat of shareholder voice would be more likely to consider implementing
some of the shareholders' ideas without a battle. And for dissidents who were
law and economics to generate useful insights in many areas of the law. Dissatisfaction with
this state of affairs gave rise to a movement, variously called Behavioral Law and
Economics (BLE), Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), and Legal Decision Theory (LDT),
that seeks to provide a more descriptively and predictively accurate account of human
behavior; this is done by replacing the law and economics movement's stylized rational man
model with a more accurate model based on empirical research arising from psychology,
cognitive science, behavioral biology, decision theory, and related fields.").
249 See Kysar, supra note 106, at 4-5 ("In recent years, however, a group of scholars has
devoted considerable insight and energy to the project of behavioral law and economics.
This emerging subdiscipline fuses traditional neoclassical economic analysis with lessons
drawn from cognitive psychology and decision theory research. The result is a law and
economics grounded in assumptions that comport better with observed real-world behavior
than the stylized rational actor model featured in conventional law and economics.")
(footnote omitted).250 See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
251 See White, supra note I ("I think most would agree that the advice on how to
respond to shareholder engagement today is quite different from the advice companies were
getting 30 years ago or even 10 years ago. The process has become less defensive and more
proactive. We are seeing a concerted effort to persuade shareholders of the wisdom of
management's choices and practices. That is a good thing. You also will consider whether
this new era of activism is actually leading to better governance practices and to increases in
shareholder value."). In addition, former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro linked the current
economic meltdown to inattentiveness of boards to shareholder interests. See Press Release,
SEC, SEC Votes To Propose Rule Amendments To Facilitate Rights of Shareholders To
Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009) ("The nation and the markets are experiencing one of
the most serious economic crises of the past century. This crisis has led many to question
whether boards of directors are truly being held accountable for the decisions they make.").
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elected, inclusion in the boardroom, in most cases, would be a moderating
experience. Dissidents shout; directors discuss. 252
Thus, giving shareholders and other stakeholders greater voice provides
positive opportunities for managers to govern the corporation more
effectively.253
In the end, the reflexive attention to evolving market preferences provides
the inextricable link between discourse and efficiency. Requiring ongoing
reflective dialogue between the corporation and its constituencies in order to
assess the legitimacy of corporate decisions helps corporate managers uncover
opportunities for wealth creation and market advantages. As those preferences
change, corporate decisions should rationally change to accommodate more
effectively the constituencies that corporate managers serve. In contrast to static
theories of the firm spurred by slavish attention to wealth maximization, a new
discourse theory of the firm better promotes economic efficiency by providing
incentives to calibrate continually corporate decision-making with the actual
preferences of consumers, investors, and other stakeholders. As a result, all
parties to the discourse enjoy mutual gains.
B. Legitimacy
Arguably more important than efficiency, a new discourse theory of the
firm promotes a revitalized sense of legitimacy within the political realm. 254
The growing influence of corporations in virtually all aspects of economic,
social, and political life already provides sufficient grounds for democratizing
more fully internal corporate structures. 255 The decision in Citizens United
pushes corporate law over the precipice and all but requires giving public
constituencies greater voice in corporate deliberations.25 6 For if corporations
dominate public opinion and set the political agenda, not much remains in the
traditional public sphere. Engendering robust senses of fairness, transparency,
and participation within the corporate context remains necessary to protect a
sense of participatory citizenship that secures our basic freedoms and popular
sovereignty.
2 52 Lowenstein, supra note 63.253 For a detailed accounting of the role that voice and exit play in organizational design
and effectiveness, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: REPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
2 54 See FINLAYSON, supra note 76, at 112-13.
2 55 See generally Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights
from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (2006);
Fairfax, supra note 63; Fairfax, supra note 89; Lee, supra note 64; Lucas E. Morel,
Commentary, The Separation of Ownership and Control in Modem Corporations:
Shareholder Democracy or Shareholder Republic?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1593 (2006);
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours ofShareholder Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1503 (2006).256 Forbath, supra note 86, at 992.
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A new discourse theory of the firm provides a rejuvenated sense of integrity
in the political realm that preserves our democratic values. Built upon the notion
that robust discourse enhances the effectiveness and justness of the
organizational structures that affect our lives, a discourse theory of the firm
requires crafting rules and incentives that promote independent expression of
opinions, equal participation by affected parties in deliberative processes,
respectful consideration of viewpoints, and the ability to alter past decisions
through continued discourse. 257 Though certainly an aspirational set of criteria
for ideal deliberation, the discourse principle represents a set of procedural
mechanisms to promote just outcomes. 258
Within the corporate setting itself, the proposed standards for enforcing
effective corporate communication and the various modes of discourse that
could satisfy those standards provide investors, consumers, and other
stakeholders with a more meaningful sense of citizenship.259 Although
corporations do not constitute traditional polities, they increasingly take on the
roles once completely within the bailiwick of government. Guiding the
evolution of corporate doctrine and utilizing principles of political philosophy
does not seem unwarranted or unwieldy. Quite to the contrary, as decisions
affecting some of the most important aspects of our lives get made by conclaves
of corporate executives, applying rules of justice to corporate law seems more
appropriate than simple contract principles governing exchanges of goods and
services. By providing greater participation of various constituencies in
corporate decision-making,260 enhanced disclosure of information relevant to
consumer and investor preferences, and better mechanisms to insure
transparency and accountability of corporate managers, a new discourse theory
of the firm properly employs a blend of political and corporate theory to secure
a basic sense of justice within corporate practices and policies.261
A revitalized sense of legitimacy also arises in the political realm as a result
of a discourse theory of the firm. The corporation as an institution has become
so important in political life that the integrity of its organizational structure
significantly affects, if not controls, the confidence in our democratic processes.
If special interests, managerial imperialism, or other antidemocratic values
dominate corporations, we will realize a diminished sense of citizenship within
our polity.262 A discourse theory of the firm strives to stave any such corruption
257 See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.259 Forbath, supra note 86, at 992.
2 6 0 HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 68, at 165-70.
261 Forbath, supra note 86, at 992 ("A constitutionally self-limiting state, a scheme of
rights that ensures a politically autonomous citizenry and a network of vibrant, legally
vouchsafed public spheres-together, these may enable the lifeworld and its communicative
or intersubjective rationality to flourish and thereby secure the emancipatory hopes Weber
abandoned and Marx mistakenly lodged in the economy.").
26 2 See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 68, at 166-67 ("[N]on-neutralizable
bargaining power should at least be disciplined by its equal distribution among the parties
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by ensuring just and fair internal corporate structures. So even if corporations
continue to increase their power and dominion in economic, social, and political
life, we gain some sense that the institution of the corporation will not
adulterate the faith in our political commitments. For if the corporation provides
meaningful avenues for taking into account the views of those whose voices
now lack much resonance in the political realm, our ability to participate in
public discourse simply shifts venues. A discourse theory of the firm attempts to
make sure those pathways for voicing effectively shareholder, consumer, and
stakeholder concerns remain robust and secure. Thus, by transferring principles
for just political organization onto the corporation, we can secure our
democratic values despite increasing corporate control over the political sphere.
VII. CONCLUSION
This second installment in a series advancing a new discourse theory of the
firm provides a set of robust political and organizational principles to guide the
evolution of the business law in a manner that can cure the otherwise
insurmountable ills infecting existing corporate theory and doctrine. As
corporations increasingly dominate our economic, social, and political lives,
and as shareholders vie for greater influence over business policies, solving
those persistent problems remains of paramount import. Predicated upon an
outmoded mantra of shareholder wealth maximization, however, current
theories of the firm provide inadequate guidance regarding the proper role of
shareholders and other stakeholders in corporate governance, place at risk the
basic viability of the $32 trillion market for CSR, and undermine the integrity of
our democratic commitments in the political realm. Because a fundamental
failure to engage in effective discourse with the constituencies that corporations
should ultimately serve lies at the core of each of these problems, a new
discourse theory of the firm seems especially useful as a new organizing
principle for corporate doctrine. Where adherence to static corporate law
principles poses extraordinary risks, a new discourse theory of the firm would
help solve the problems infecting current corporate law, promote greater
efficiency in business decisions, and ensure a basic legitimacy within the
political realm.
. .. [securing] all the interested parties with an equal opportunity for pressure ... to
influence one another in the actual bargaining, so that all the affected interests can come into
play and have equal chances of prevailing."); see also Forbath, supra note 86, at 992.
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